

In addition, *santri*-based parties are also trapped with the tendency of pragmatism similar to nationalist party. Therefore, the Islamic characteristics either formally shown by PPP and PKS or informally shown by PKB and PAN do not own the "market share" electorally. The voters cannot understand clearly the quality of Islamic parties, compare to nationalist parties. In fact, the *santri*-based parties often perform a coalition with any party and support anyone who becomes a governor or regent/mayor regardless of religious background or *track record* of the candidates, as long as they have political advantageous.

The relation between *santri*-based parties and voters described above shows that ideological consideration is not the only consideration in giving vote in the election. The voters' preference is also determined by the voter's interest. The voters' interest is the closeness of voters with the selected parties. This closeness is developed based on the proximity of the interests with party, through media campaign. Mujani and Liddle (2010) argue "Voters were influenced in addition by the media campaigns of parties and presidential candidates, by their perceptions of the state of the national economy and by their evaluations of governmental performance." Within this voters' behavior, Hamayotsu (2011) indicates that the voters' pragmatism behavior potentially create a disaster for the *santri*-based parties and will make them losing their public role if it is not managed properly. This view is quite reasonable because several nationalist parties also demonstrate their Islamic spirit in a various level of policies has been set up. Further, many nationalist party, support some *santri* politicians in local election as Governor and Regent/Mayor.

However, the facts that have been discussed above cannot be generalized to all *santri*-based parties. Referring to Haris' postulate in distinguishing between the Islamic political party with nationalist parties classify are difficult to be determined. But this condition is not applied for all *santri*-based parties. For example, PPP, which clearly and firmly has known as Islamic party, but in fact it experienced disorientation of purposes in the policies of the party. While PKB, PAN and PKS experienced inconsistency in applying parties' policies. These inconsistencies are caused by both internal and external conflicts of interest which lead to utilise all means to develop relationships with ruling administration. This view is more accurately described as out-of-the-law (Boucek, 2005). While the assumption of "national Islam" remains as ideological trend of *santri*-based parties although they have fluctuate relationships with the power.

Parties that are inconsistent in building relationships with ruling power are mostly caused by internal and external conflicts. A conflict is created by the internal faction competition in reaching party domination. The government's recognition through the Minister of Law and Human Rights (KumHAM) for certain faction, led to other factions to think pragmatically by setting up a new party or switching their membership to another party, even though they are different in ideology. It seems that real faction (Boucek, 2005) is stronger than the personal faction. Real faction is usually constructed by the different of political principles, objectives and attitudes that lead to each member take a different stance with the general principles of the party. The political party faction acted pragmatically in seeking government recognition. It seems as effort in seeking profit (incentives) especially in selective incentives (Storm, 1990), short-term profit--rather than the collective incentives.

In regards to the discussion above, there are two political roles of *santri*-based parties in the future. First, *santri* politicians are getting narrow in the national stage. This is because *santri*-based parties faces difficulties to compete with nationalist parties due some considerations; (1) It is difficult to find a figure to support in national politics in electoral competitions of President and Vice President. Not many second-tier party figures emerged after the era of Gus Dur and Amien Rais that is acceptable among *santri* as well as the nationalist elite. Meanwhile, the second-tier groups of nationalists continue to emerge with the birth of young competitive cadres. Political scape in the next ten or twenty years is estimated to range from the fight between the nationalists vs nationalists. It is estimated that Jokowi vs Prabowo is still a central issue in the next decade. Furthermore, the next period will continue between Puan Maharani (the daughter of Megawati) vs Agus Harimurti (the son of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) as the children of the former presidents, or other young leaders of the nationalists and the military. Meanwhile, the figures of *santri* have not appeared with promising strength and charisma. The

political power of *santri* is expected to be subordinate of nationalist political that has been established; (2) It is vulnerable as the party's internal conflicts will interfere the organization consolidation. Political parties do not have a strong management in managing internal conflicts, so that any political difference is always accompanied by internal conflict; (3) Some Islamic political parties still show their image as the "elite party," or "gentry party." There is contention in selection and pointing process of party management board at the national, provincial or district/city level which still considering the *dynasty* of the family especially the one who has title as *kiai*, *nyai* and *gus*.

Second, *santri*-based parties will have stronger bargain due to the growth of Muslim population in Indonesia. In the recent era, there are new detrimental movement to Muslims. In this context, the Islamic party must take advantage by displaying a solid, professional, and comprehensive image and portraying modern and peaceful organisation compare to the radical Islamic political movements which weaken the position of Islam in the national political atmosphere. The negative image of radical Islamic political movements that displays as stiff, extreme and undemocratic should be changed by the *santri* leaders by displaying the exact opposite behavior. They should show Islam as a peaceful religion, not extreme and accommodate democratic value. When the *santri*-based parties fails in convincing the voters and provide a significant evidence of the elite behavior in represent Islamic value in nation development process, the *santri*-based parties will getting smaller.

Discussion about the *santri*-based parties political ideology, above, have shown that *santri* politics is merely "symbolic." *Santri* politics is only a symbols represented by the political parties in the name of *santri*-. The *santri*-based parties labelling has shown through the organization constitution, the logo, and the utilisation of religious symbols such as caps, turbans, heads carves, mosques and *madrasah* (Islamic school) for gathering voters support. Furthermore, in order to maximizing the support, the claim of having some mass base organisation support, and the support from other proponent religious organisation must be declared in advance. In this context, *santri* become "tools" instead of "goal." A tool for gaining short-term political interests in accessing political power in legislative and executive position. Therefore, the substantive of *santri* politics are not deliberated clearly. *Santri* politics is the politics of struggle in practicing Islamic values in the life of the nation. The values are demonstrated through honesty, discipline, work ethic and hard work. The values are not just jargon but need to be practiced in daily life of the actors and their environment.

Conclusion

Politics of pragmatic consideration (rational choice) is more prominent than the politics of value, as it is reflected in the theological principles (monotheism) of *santri*-based parties. It can be justified that the aspect of theological value is not solely the goal as well as the use of Islamic symbols that attribute their performance. *Santri* politics faces many challenges during the last one and half decades. The challenges occur from both internal and external aspects. The internal challenge is the failure of *santri* practicing the values of *santri* in politics because of their normative, historical and sociological responsibilities. The external challenge is the nationalist parties pressure that campaigning religious character of their parties' platform. Practically, *santri*-based parties just perform symbolically, not substantively. The ideologies, rules and spirit are not proportional to the performance and behavior of the party' leaders. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish between *santri*-based and non-*santri*-based parties, or between the behaviors of *santri* and non-*santri* politicians. They have no difference in behaviours.

Resuming this discussion, *santri* politics can be grouped into two groups. *First*, the parties that conduct any means to gain power and neglecting the principles, values, and norm that stated in the party constitution. These parties are PKB, PAN and PKS. *Second*, the party that experiencing obscurity of direction and objectives of the struggle, or even have misled over their existing goals. The example of a party who experiences disoriented ideology is PPP.

Nonetheless, the study of *santri* politics remains an interesting issue in the next decades. The Islamic political party continues to modernize both the platform and program. What is more, the nationalist parties continue to need support and political legitimacy of religious groups. In the era of President Jokowi, even afterwards, the political power of *santri* continues to be an alternative power in supporting the nationalist political forces.

In relation with this issue *santri* must be able to translate the doctrine of Islam and used for strengthening, tightening, and enlightening public life. Moreover, it must be demonstrated by the *santri*'s ability in enhancing their livelihood. There are two old proverb that should be considerate by *santri* in their involvement in politic; "organized badness has better chance to gain a victory than unorganized goodness" and "the voice of people is the voice of God". This two proverbs may be regarded as a theological clue for *santri* to take side into the majority voters, included *abangan* (disobedient adherents) group. It is a part of the efforts to hear and pick up "the voice of God".

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