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Between Values and Power; Ideological Orientation of *Santri*-Based Parties in Indonesia

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Abstract

Political parties in Indonesia have evolved from time to time, including *santri*-based political parties. The management board changes, constituent demands, and the impact of power relation are the factors that influence the political parties' changes. The aim of this study is to analyze the relationship between values and power in the *santri*-based parties, in relation with the consistency of the parties and the politicians in a struggle for supporting ideology practices. The methods of this study are literature review and participant observation by using content analysis, discourse analysis and self-reflective. The findings indicate that the *santri*-based parties face a dilemma and burden in practicing Islamic values when they had been elected for house representative or executive position. As a result, the elected politicians often act pragmatically beyond the platform of the party. This study classifies the *santri*-based parties into two groups: out-of-the-law party and disorientation party. The former means that the party neglecting and not comply with the principles, values, and norm that stated in the party constitution in obtaining power. PKB, PAN and PKS are examples. While the latter means the party actions and program has developed beyond the party goals and constitution. PPP is an example. The major cause is the internal vulnerable condition the party encountering that triggered by conflict in gaining mass basis support. Furthermore, the Islamic parties also experience external competition with nationalist religious party in gaining votes. However, even though the Islamic parties have internal and external challenges, *santri*-based parties remain acknowledged as a significant political force. This is because the Islamic party has significant and real social support from Muslim voters and strong bargaining power in the political arena in Indonesia.

Keywords: *santri*-based parties, values, power, pragmatism, ideological orientation

Introduction

Rapid political development in Indonesia after Suharto's administration make the political parties experiencing structural and strategy changes in gaining public support and winning the election, maintaining power, including *santri* (devoted Muslim scholar)-based party (Nurhasim, 2016). *Santri* politics defines as a party movement that develops their ideology and constitution based on Islamic values. The parties categorized as *Santri*-based are PPP (*The United Development Party*), PKB (*The National Awakening Party*), PAN (*The National Mandate Party*), PBB (*The Crescent Star Party*) and PKS (*The Prosperous Justice Party*) (Yunanto, 2013). Three indicators identified that the *santri*-based parties orientation has changed. First, the support from PPP and PKB

for Ahok (Basuki Tjahya Purnama) as a candidate for Governor of Jakarta as well as the support from PPP for the Vice Governor of North Sumatra in 2018, Sihar Sitorus, without considering the background of religion and behaviors that are considered contrary to the values shared by the community. Second, the parties are incapacity in controlling corruption practices committed by their members both in the executive and legislative. Third, the inconsistency of parties in policy formulation and practice.

In Indonesian political history, the political role of *santri* is significant and continues until nowadays. The political role of *santri* is in line with the expectations of the people who need political channels as well as antithesis of the role of nationalist parties in the political arena. However, being dominant and the leading party is far from the reality due to intense competitiveness of the political arena and thus make the holistic implementation of the Islamic value is not easily practiced when the Muslim politician was elected. Many political intrigues and personal interests determine the role.

Relations between Islam and state has provided area research that investigates the involvement of *santri* in politics. The study of politics and political Islam in Indonesia always involves entities of *santri*. Even though both are on two different positions, but the relations is interlinked. *Santri* is identified as a pious and obedient Muslim, particularly in conducting five times prayers (Geertz, 1960). Politics is a media of movement for the implementation of Islamic values in the nation-state practice. The role of *santri* in politics is associated with the belief that Islam and the state are entities that need each other.

The study of *santri* politics has progressed, particularly after the Soeharto's "New Order" administration fell down. The study of *santri* politics can be classified into three models. *First*, the philosophical and fundamental study of the relations between Islam and state in the relation to the position of Islam as the source of value in the nation-state practice and the way to attaching Islam and democracy. There are several recent studies about this issue raised by Effendy (Effendy, 1998), Abdullah (2011), and Woodward (2015).

Second, the study of Islamic practice in practical politics. This study deals with the concept of Islamic practice in Indonesian political life. The emergence of political terms in political Islam that manifests in party and religious organizations' symbols becomes part of this study. Haris (2008), Baswedan (2004), Amir (2003), Romli (2014), Thantowi (2005), and Carnegie (2008) are the scholars who explored the issue.

Third, the internal and external dynamics of *santri*-based parties. Internal dynamics are related to power struggles and conflict management, while the external dynamics are related to the integration model of power and power struggle with the nationalist parties. There are several studies conducted by Assaukanie (2004), Yunanto and Hamid (2013), Hamayatsu (2011), Mahmudi (2008), Umam and Junaidi (2017), Wanto (2012), and Nurhasim (2016).

This study has different specifications compared to previous studies. This study has three aims. *First*, it analyzes the power relations and the role of *santri*-based parties in struggling for Islamic values in political life. *Second*, it investigates the reconciliation process of Islamic values with democracy under political parties' platform. *Third*, it observes the consistency of *santri*-based parties struggle for a political ideology based on religious values and democracy. This study plays significant role in evaluating religious ideological domain of *santri*-based parties, regardless religious ideology as a booster, a reinforcement or simply used as a tool to reach a political acknowledgement. Further, the study also aims to identify the difference between Islamic and nationalist parties, and how their future in Indonesian political stage.

This paper also discuss some subtopics related to the core issue studied. First, portray the relations between political party and power. Second, reveal the dilemma between values and power. Third, discuss political pragmatism. Final parts of this paper are conclusion and suggestion regarding possibility of further study.

Various Perspectives on Political Party Ideology

Ideology (Springer, et.al, 2009), of political party in Indonesia is divided into two categories: secular-Islamic ideology and democracy-pro market (Sugiono, Muhadi, Mas'udi, 2008). While Evans (2003) made left-right categories that lead to the "Islamic-secular" and "socialist-liberal." Pratikno (2006), on the other hand, uses the category "elitist-populist" and "Islam-Western/secular". These theories are not really shifting from the old theories, between the "Islam-secular," "traditional-conservative" or "Java-non Java" (Feith, Castles, 1970).

Based on this categorisation, politics in Indonesia leads to the three strong categories; "Islamist," "nationalists" and "secular nationalists." Aminudin and Masykuri (2015), divide the ideology of *santri*-based parties into two categories: "Transnational Islam" ideology (Hilmy, 2011) that adapts the model of the Middle East parties such as PKS, and "National Islam" ideology which was divided into "conservative" and "moderate." Conservative is represented by PPP and PBB (Gjorshoski, 2015), while moderate is represented by PKB and PAN (Amir, 2003). While Pepinsky, Liddle and Mujani (2018) used term "Islamic parties" refer to PKB and PAN, and "islamist parties" refer to PPP and PBB.

The ideological orientation is often obscured by the interests of the party or the behavior of the elites and political party's members. According to Bettcher (2005), there are two dimensions attached in political parties, (i) ideology (principle) or/and (ii) pragmatism (interest). Within the dimensions, politics are always embedded to management boards and parties' constituent as political actors. Strom (1990) explained three goals of politician: (1) to be elected (re-election) in the parliament, as intended by all political parties (seek vote party); (2) To obtain status and power as executive position; (3) To promote the policy and ideology of the party in order to obtain a power bargain. Generally, politics is often understood as politics is all about power (Heywood, 2004). Politics is about what, how and when powers were obtained.

Meanwhile, the relations between political parties and powers are divided into two major groups; namely balance of power and dominant of power. According to Boucek (2009), in the balance of power relation, there are competitions, cooperation, and even conflict at the intra-level of political parties. Those conditions occur from the political factions.

The theories of rational change and network exchange are used to discuss the role and orientation of organizations and actors. According to Coleman (1992), the actions of someone in the organization leads to one purpose, and that purpose was (and action) is determined by the value and preference. Human actions are conducted based on rational choice. According to Peter M. Blau, understanding the social structure should be based on social processes that affect the relationship between individuals and groups. The relationship is based on those choices (Cohen, 1969).

Based on the theories of rational change and network exchange, the individual actors in politics are essential. As a rational actor, individuals are always goal-oriented that reflects what they consider of self-interest. To determine the efficient attitude and action, they have to choose between several options and determine which alternative will bring the most benefit and maximum use.

Coleman (1992) theory is originated from the network exchange theory or known as NET. This theory emphasizes on power. The premise is that the greater chance of the actors to exchange, the greater power of the actor. As a result of their position in the network, the actors (politician) will have various chances in seizing the opportunity to exchange, control and accumulate profit.

Methods

This study used a qualitative approach in understanding and developing propositions or explaining the meanings behind the events. Researchers are grounded in empirical facts about the behavior and obsession of *santri*-based parties in gaining and competing for power. This approach is presented naturally and then interpreted based on the views of researchers. Creswell (2013) called this approach as naturalistic-interpretative.

Data collection. The data of this research data are from books, journals, the organizational documents, and print and online media, such as Kompas, Tempo, Jawa Post and CNN. The media is a group of the mainstream media that is often referred to and read by Indonesian people. The media report daily the dynamics of Jakarta governor election between the ends of 2016 until May 2017. This research also conducted a participant observation. Researchers had interacted and engaged in discussions and meetings with the leaders of the parties.

Analysis. The researchers employ the content analysis technique to analyze the data. The analysis starts with setting goals, organizing categories, revising categories, making conclusions and interpretations (Marying, 2000). In addition, the analysis methods discourse is used as well. The analysis method discourse in politics conducted through set up a context, preparing materials, examining the text structure, identifying the divergent text, and interpreting the data and findings (Glynos, et. al., 2009). While the 'self-reflective' technique (Higgins and Johnson, 1998) is used to observe and understand the political events as researchers maintain close tie to some political actors.

Dilemma between Value and Power

Santri-based parties face a dilemma in the political constellation in Indonesia. As the representation of Muslim constituency, the party has an obligation to fulfill the political promises as a moral responsibility. This dilemma makes the party face an ignorant models that often ignore the principle of civility. What is more, the parties also have to adhere a holistic principles, values and religious norm. These principles and values are embedded through party symbols or implicitly developed by political preferences. The value is the standard norm of party that is transcribed in their constitution which stated the vision, missions, purposes and basis of the party movement and programs. The nomination processes of legislative and executive candidate as the party's main objectives must refer to organisation constitution.

Santri-based parties have two responsibilities: the guidance of religion values as well as the centre back of nationality values. These responsibilities are an obligation in servicing the mighty God and the community. The responsibilities of *santri*-based parties possess three aspects: theological, historical and sociological.

"Theological" responsibility is about the belief that politics is part of religion. Islam without sharia, politics is very difficult to implement (Syarif, 2013). In that context, the involvement in politics or the election of a leader is a necessity. The intellectuals with this traditionalist political thinking are Abu Hasan 'Ali ibn Habib al-Mawardi (975-1059), Rashid Rida (1865-1935), Sayyid Quthub (1906- 1966), and Abu 'Ala al-Maududi (1903-1979). Al Mawardi insisted that leadership is a part of politics, has aims to maintain and preserve the religion, and manage the world affairs. As al-Mawardi, Sayyid Quthub, Khalid Ahmad Syantut also confirmed the link between religion and politics. He said, "it is impossible to proselytize in goodness without the existence of the king (leader) in government because the commands and prohibitions basically cannot be realized without their leader" (Syarif, 2013). On this basis, *santri* and politics are one in separable unit.

"Historical responsibility" is the past history when the Prophet, companions and the scholars' (ulama') practiced Islam in the nation-state practice. The ways of the Prophet in integrating Islam and society both in Mecca and Medina were able to perform a new civilization through the model of *ummah*. The Prophet tradition was continued by *Khulafa 'al-Rashidin* so the term "*khilafah*" or "*khalifah*" in English known as caliph exist as the title of community leader (Khaldūn, 1993; Ridā, 1341 H; al-Sa'idī, 1977; Mulyani, 1997; Crone, Hinds, 1990). The title continued until the 20th century marked with the end of Turkey Uthmani leadership.

“Sociological responsibility” lies on the fact that 87% of Indonesia's population is Muslim, which requires a protection and political acknowledgment in the state constitution (Bruinessen, 1994; Haidar, 1994). The emergence of Islamic parties is a part of being protected and acknowledged in the nation-state practice. The strength of Islamic parties is quite dominant in the electoral history that gain between 30% to 43% of the national votes. The votes are very fluctuates, following the political trend in Indonesia. Those three responsibilities have always been the "shadow" of *santri*-based parties and demanded by constituents.

As a political party, the tasks of *santri*-based parties are supporting the Islamic values to become the principal and foundation on the nation-state practice in order to full fill the constituent expectations. The Islamic values as foundation of the party movement and campaign promise are two hard responsibilities to be practiced. The inability to interpret the two aspects lead to political elites conducting "wrong" decisions. One of the consequences of such misconduct is corruption or the authority misuse. Several party leaders went to jail within the last five years. They were Lutfi Hasan Ishaq (PKS) and Surya Dharma Ali (PPP). In the past two years, two governors of PAN party figures (Zumi Zola, Governor of Jambi and Nur Alam, Governor of Southeast Sulawesi) are suspects of corruption. The same thing happened to Anas Urbaningrum, Chairman of the Democratic Party known as genuine *santri* and the president of The Islamic Students Association (HMI). There was also *Kyai* Fuad Amin Imron, the Regent of Bangkalan, who was also jailed.¹ Some leaders of *santri*-based parties at the Provincial or District/City also experienced the same problem.

Some leader names of *santri*-based parties are the second generation after the independence of Indonesia. Most of them are *new santri* - a term for the generation of *santri* who take secular education both at home country and abroad. This generation enlives the modern Indonesian politics. The majority of Islamic parties activist are come from educated group of *new santri*. The combination of religion and knowledge as well as extensive network affects on the image and platform of the party. *New santri* is grouped into three types; convergent, radical and global. Convergent *santri* is the traditionalist or modernist Islamic activists who decided to coalesce with each other (Effendy, 2003). Radical *santri* feel pessimistic with the models of Islamic movement carried out by the traditionalists and modernists. They offer a radical change in Indonesia instead. Its main agenda is, "*the establishment of an Islamic state-would be the main agenda to replace the existing state*" (Machmudi, 2008). Global *santri* is a group of traditionalists and modernists that has been influenced by trans-national movements in the Middle East (Bruinessen, 2002). They joined the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Jamaah Tabligh (JT) and the Salafi groups.

The existence of *new santri* in the bureaucracy, professional world, academic., mass organizations and political organizations in one and half decades are the evidence of the *santri* role in national arena. In short, *santri* contribute in the middle layer of the new social strata. Therefore, they acknowledge as middle-class society. The upper-middle-class of this social group consists of members of parliament, general director, directors, heads of agencies, and the chair and key positions holder in various government agencies.

The examples of *new santri* figures are Mukti Ali, Nurcholish Madjid, Shafi'i Maarif, Dawam Rahardjo, and Abdurrahman Wahid. The factual impact of *new santri* role in nation-state arena is the public acceptance, especially Java to Islam. Islam has become a middle-class identity and a bureaucracy symbol in the New Order era. In the early 1990s, the relationship between Islam and the state reach its peak position. At this era, the relationship between Islam and the state becomes "complete." State (Soeharto) has a honeymoon period with Islam when *santri* join the bureaucracy and support the administration. Ricklefs acknowledge this era as the "completeness" of Islamization in Java with the presence of *new santri* groups in the national political stage (Ricklefs, 2013).

¹ The mainstream media reported corruption practices of party leaders, such as Kompas, Jawa Pos, Detik, and Tempo. News about Lutfi Hasan Ishaq (PKS) can be seen between October to December 2013, news about Muhaimin Iskandar can be seen in May-July 2015, Surya Dharma Ali (PPP) news can be seen between May-July 20016, and news about PAN leaders involved in corruption can be viewed on news pages between April-September 2017.

The emergence of *santri* figures in elite bureaucracy occurs simultaneously through the government's accommodative policy, especially the New Order with the Islamic group. *Santri* groups enter the middle class as the result of this policy. There are countless groups of *santri* who become politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen and even the military. However, even though many educated *santri* has involved in bureaucratic hierarchy in government administration, the values as the party standard norm are not completely run by *santri*-based parties. Referring to the Deliar Noer postulate, there are four groups of Muslims in Indonesia; (1) Muslims with commitment to Islam; (2) Muslims who cooperate with the government; (3) Muslims who simply believe Islam is just "teaching"; and (4) Muslims who integrate religion and politics (Noer, 1998). *New santri* were in all groups mentioned above.

The emergence of *new santri* is not proportional to the practice Islamic value in the society. Some views believe that *new santri* is just an hyperbolic myth (Romli, 2014), but in fact, it has no significant impact in politics-or even considered fail, the evidence of this opinion is develop based on the result of the election time to time. Since the 1955 election, the *santri* based parties just gaining 43% of voters and become just 30% in average during the Reform Era. The electoral result affects the political power of *santri* who become subordinate over the Nationalist Party.

Political Pragmatism

The poor result of *Santri*-based parties in election makes the parties pragmatic. Pragmatic party would eliminate the role of the party's ideology in every action. The party's decision is no longer based on the standing point of ideology, but rather to consider the logic of profit and loss (Mahadi, 2011). Political pragmatism of *santri*-based parties is motivated by the "dynamic" and "relaxed" atmosphere of the parties go towards political pragmatism. By definition, it can be called as pragmatic if the parties give priority to short-term interests by setting aside the normative values of the party. In other words, the pragmatic parties put the interests of a practical way or the results more important than other things as long as they win.

Dynamic means that politics cannot be separated from the internal tension and conflict among political factions. The emergence of faction occurs from the ambiguous relationship between political parties and mass organizations as the political patron. At this case, PKB, PKNU (The Ulama National Awakening Party) and PPP are the right example. Those three parties have the same history because they are established or facilitated by the leaders of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama, the biggest muslim organization) and *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school). They claimed as part of NU. As the consequence, they experienced intervention and mixture of political interest with NU as mass organizations. In many cases in some areas, the board of the party also becomes the board of NU. For nearly a decade, those three parties are trapped with severe internal conflict.

Relaxed atmosphere means that *santri*-based parties are moderate and open minded. At this term ideology is not much revealed. It has been shown from the involvement of non-Muslim groups and non-*santri* in the management board of the party. They start having much closer relations with the other groups and parties because of they are moderate and open minded.

In the last few elections, it is revealed the relaxed atmosphere of *santri* politics phenomena. Firstly, there is the emergence of a new spirit of change in the nationalist parties to become "nationalist-religious" party. The evidence of this new spirit is when PDIP (The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), the Democratic Party, the National Democratic (Nasdem Party), and the Golongan Karya Party proclaimed themselves as a nationalist-religious party. Some of them accommodated Muslim activists and leaders in their religious affiliation organisation. Secondly, there is no internal conflict management model that reflects the behavior of *santri*. Their internal conflict often more vulnerable than the nationalist parties. The terrible internal conflict had happened in 2000 to 2009 in PKB, PKNU and PBR (The Star Reform Party), and PPP in 2014 - 2015. The internal conflicts often involved well-known and influential *kiai* (ulama'), which can reduce their authority.

Thirdly, there is a trend of Islamic parties to become more moderate. PKB and PKS are the example. These two political parties have strong traditional stance in implementing Islamic norm and value in nation-state arena but recently both parties become more moderate and shifted to the middle. They adapt to the external changes and dynamics outside the party (Hamayotsu, 2011). Meanwhile, PPP with its Islamic ideology, board, and representatives of Islamic groups started to lose their political orientation. The recent example was that when PPP support Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok) in Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2016. Despite the dualism gubernatorial support of PPP, both PPP led by Romahurmuzy and PPP led by Djan Farid support Ahok. The same thing happened in the nomination of the Deputy Governor of North Sumatra, Sihar Sitorus, paired with Jarot Saiful Hidayat (2018). It is very questionable that PPP shows uncommon support to those leaders because PPP is usually embedded with Islamic voice and interests of the Muslims. The *branding* of PPP as the "house of Muslims" become empirically opposite with the facts.

Political rationality aspects become one of the options as the result of those situation. Political rationality develop based on the profit and loss consideration, therefore the process of political transactions cannot be ignored (Coleman, 1992). They consider the profit in making decisions. The bidding process in the party decision-making process has reciprocal agreement that is not solely erected based on the value and norm consideration. The rational values develop through the calculation, how much political investment should be spent and how much political gains could be earned (Cohen, 1969).

The political rationality identified through two indicators. First, the number of *santri* politicians switching their membership from one party to another party. It is very easy to find the former Islamic party activists change their membership and support nationalist parties². Several cases in the 2014 election can be found in Islamic parties. PKB politicians switch their membership to the NasDem Party, such as Effendi Choirie, Hj. Lily Wahid, Hasan Aminuddin, and Hermawi Taslim. The transfer previously happened when Chotibul Umam Wiranu moved to the Democratic Party, AS Hikam became the Hanura politician, and Choirul Anam moved to Gerindra. The membership changes of PKS politicians also occurred in the same year, such as Misbakhun to the Golkar Party and Yusuf Supendi to the Hanura Party. Zainal Maarif is also another example. He changed his membership from PPP/PBR (2004) to the Democratic Party. The membership change dynamic also happened at the level of the management of provincial³ and district/city. Many reason behind those political party membership changes, most of them stated that they has been reach their saturation point and seeking another challenge, but some of the change their membership because they had lose in the internal competition. This is because they are always looking for an efficient way to achieve the goal (Coleman, 1992).

Second, there is the political segmentations of *santri* in rural area and lower-middle-class that has high emotional political embeddedship. Some *santri*-based parties like PKB and PPP still rely on rural area based-especially in Java-, which less concerned about the political developments. Their political preferences are caused by a common religious outlook and political gifts and campaign promises during the general election.

Ideological disorientation?

The discourses above demonstrate the Islamic parties' ideological reduction process. Referring to the Haris (2016) postulate, Islamic parties are not only "nervous" but also experiencing disorientation. It is based on Islamic parties' incapacity to formulate clear, comprehensive and implementable strategies. Voters are difficult to distinguish any difference between the *santri*-based parties with each other except the symbol and color differentiation. Ambardi (2009) underlined that ideology consideration stops at the time of the election. Ideology can only be seen when they fight for gaining the votes during elections (Ambardi, 2009; Wanto, 2012).

². For example, Gus Ipul (Syaefullah Yusuf, Deputy Governor of East Java), initially took charge of the PDI-P, and then moved to the PPP, moved again to the PKB. After losing in the competition with Muhaimin Iskandar, he resigned from PKB. The same case happened to Khofifah Indar Parawansa, Effendy Choirie, Chotibul Umam Wiranu, Bursah Zarnubi, etc.

³ For example, in East Java in 2014 until now, some politicians of *santri* move to the nationalist party. Such as Anwar Sadat of PKB/PKNU moved to Gerindra. Hasan Aminuddin and some board of NasDem in East Java come from PKB. Mohammad Mirdas' previous career was in the PPP, but now has moved to Perindo.

In addition, *santri*-based parties are also trapped with the tendency of pragmatism similar to nationalist party. Therefore, the Islamic characteristics either formally shown by PPP and PKS or informally shown by PKB and PAN do not own the "market share" electorally. The voters cannot understand clearly the quality of Islamic parties, compare to nationalist parties. In fact, the *santri*-based parties often perform a coalition with any party and support anyone who becomes a governor or regent/mayor regardless of religious background or *track record* of the candidates, as long as they have political advantageous.

The relation between *santri*-based parties and voters described above shows that ideological consideration is not the only consideration in giving vote in the election. The voters' preference is also determined by the voter's interest. The voters' interest is the closeness of voters with the selected parties. This closeness is developed based on the proximity of the interests with party, through media campaign. Mujani and Liddle (2010) argue "Voters were influenced in addition by the media campaigns of parties and presidential candidates, by their perceptions of the state of the national economy and by their evaluations of governmental performance." Within this voters' behavior, Hamayotsu (2011) indicates that the voters' pragmatism behavior potentially create a disaster for the *santri*-based parties and will make them losing their public role if it is not managed properly. This view is quite reasonable because several nationalist parties also demonstrate their Islamic spirit in a various level of policies has been set up. Further, many nationalist party, support some *santri* politicians in local election as Governor and Regent/Mayor.

However, the facts that have been discussed above cannot be generalized to all *santri*-based parties. Referring to Haris' postulate in distinguishing between the Islamic political party with nationalist parties classify are difficult to be determined. But this condition is not applied for all *santri*-based parties. For example, PPP, which clearly and firmly has known as Islamic party, but in fact it experienced disorientation of purposes in the policies of the party. While PKB, PAN and PKS experienced inconsistency in applying parties' policies. These inconsistencies are caused by both internal and external conflicts of interest which lead to utilise all means to develop relationships with ruling administration. This view is more accurately described as out-of-the-law (Boucek, 2005). While the assumption of "national Islam" remains as ideological trend of *santri*-based parties although they have fluctuate relationships with the power.

Parties that are inconsistent in building relationships with ruling power are mostly caused by internal and external conflicts. A conflict is created by the internal faction competition in reaching party domination. The government's recognition through the Minister of Law and Human Rights (KumHAM) for certain faction, led to other factions to think pragmatically by setting up a new party or switching their membership to another party, even though they are different in ideology. It seems that real faction (Boucek, 2005) is stronger than the personal faction. Real faction is usually constructed by the different of political principles, objectives and attitudes that lead to each member take a different stance with the general principles of the party. The political party faction acted pragmatically in seeking government recognition. It seems as effort in seeking profit (incentives) especially in selective incentives (Storm, 1990), short-term profit--rather than the collective incentives.

In regards to the discussion above, there are two political roles of *santri*-based parties in the future. First, *santri* politicians are getting narrow in the national stage. This is because *santri*-based parties faces difficulties to compete with nationalist parties due some considerations; (1) It is difficult to find a figure to support in national politics in electoral competitions of President and Vice President. Not many second-tier party figures emerged after the era of Gus Dur and Amien Rais that is acceptable among *santri* as well as the nationalist elite. Meanwhile, the second-tier groups of nationalists continue to emerge with the birth of young competitive cadres. Political scape in the next ten or twenty years is estimated to range from the fight between the nationalists vs nationalists. It is estimated that Jokowi vs Prabowo is still a central issue in the next decade. Furthermore, the next period will continue between Puan Maharani (the daughter of Megawati) vs Agus Harimurti (the son of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) as the children of the former presidents, or other young leaders of the nationalists and the military. Meanwhile, the figures of *santri* have not appeared with promising strength and charisma. The

political power of *santri* is expected to be subordinate of nationalist political that has been established; (2) It is vulnerable as the party's internal conflicts will interfere the organization consolidation. Political parties do not have a strong management in managing internal conflicts, so that any political difference is always accompanied by internal conflict; (3) Some Islamic political parties still show their image as the "elite party," or "gentry party." There is contention in selection and pointing process of party management board at the national, provincial or district/city level which still considering the *dynasty* of the family especially the one who has title as *kiai*, *nyai* and *gus*.

Second, *santri*-based parties will have stronger bargain due to the growth of Muslim population in Indonesia. In the recent era, there are new detrimental movement to Muslims. In this context, the Islamic party must take advantage by displaying a solid, professional, and comprehensive image and portraying modern and peaceful organisation compare to the radical Islamic political movements which weaken the position of Islam in the national political atmosphere. The negative image of radical Islamic political movements that displays as stiff, extreme and undemocratic should be changed by the *santri* leaders by displaying the exact opposite behavior. They should show Islam as a peaceful religion, not extreme and accommodate democratic value. When the *santri*-based parties fails in convincing the voters and provide a significant evidence of the elite behavior in represent Islamic value in nation development process, the *santri*-based parties will getting smaller.

Discussion about the *santri*-based parties political ideology, above, have shown that *santri* politics is merely "symbolic." *Santri* politics is only a symbols represented by the political parties in the name of *santri*-. The *santri*-based parties labelling has shown through the organization constitution, the logo, and the utilisation of religious symbols such as caps, turbans, heads carves, mosques and *madrasah* (Islamic school) for gathering voters support. Furthermore, in order to maximizing the support, the claim of having some mass base organisation support, and the support from other proponent religious organisation must be declared in advance. In this context, *santri* become "tools" instead of "goal." A tool for gaining short-term political interests in accessing political power in legislative and executive position. Therefore, the substantive of *santri* politics are not deliberated clearly. *Santri* politics is the politics of struggle in practicing Islamic values in the life of the nation. The values are demonstrated through honesty, discipline, work ethic and hard work. The values are not just jargon but need to be practiced in daily life of the actors and their environment.

Conclusion

Politics of pragmatic consideration (rational choice) is more prominent than the politics of value, as it is reflected in the theological principles (monotheism) of *santri*-based parties. It can be justified that the aspect of theological value is not solely the goal as well as the use of Islamic symbols that attribute their performance. *Santri* politics faces many challenges during the last one and half decades. The challenges occur from both internal and external aspects. The internal challenge is the failure of *santri* practicing the values of *santri* in politics because of their normative, historical and sociological responsibilities. The external challenge is the nationalist parties pressure that campaigning religious character of their parties' platform. Practically, *santri*-based parties just perform symbolically, not substantively. The ideologies, rules and spirit are not proportional to the performance and behavior of the party' leaders. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish between *santri*-based and non-*santri*-based parties, or between the behaviors of *santri* and non-*santri* politicians. They have no difference in behaviours.

Resuming this discussion, *santri* politics can be grouped into two groups. *First*, the parties that conduct any means to gain power and neglecting the principles, values, and norm that stated in the party constitution. These parties are PKB, PAN and PKS. *Second*, the party that experiencing obscurity of direction and objectives of the struggle, or even have misled over their existing goals. The example of a party who experiences disoriented ideology is PPP.

Nonetheless, the study of *santri* politics remains an interesting issue in the next decades. The Islamic political party continues to modernize both the platform and program. What is more, the nationalist parties continue to need support and political legitimacy of religious groups. In the era of President Jokowi, even afterwards, the political power of *santri* continues to be an alternative power in supporting the nationalist political forces.

In relation with this issue *santri* must be able to translate the doctrine of Islam and used for strengthening, tightening, and enlightening public life. Moreover, it must be demonstrated by the *santri*'s ability in enhancing their livelihood. There are two old proverb that should be considerate by *santri* in their involvement in politic; "organized badness has better chance to gain a victory than unorganized goodness" and "the voice of people is the voice of God". This two proverbs may be regarded as a theological clue for *santri* to take side into the majority voters, included *abangan* (disobedient adherents) group. It is a part of the efforts to hear and pick up "the voice of God".

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