


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PARTAI KEADILAN SEJAHTERA:
A MAWDUDIAN-MELIORIST VISION
OF ISLAMISM IN POST-NEW ORDER INDONESIA

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Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: A Mawdudian-Meliorist Vision of Islamism in Post-New Order Indonesia

Abstraksi: Keikutsertaan PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) dalam sistem politik kepartaian menandai babak baru bagi perjalanan Islamisme di Indonesia. PKS merupakan genre baru Islam politik yang menghadirkan keunikan-keunikan tersendiri dibanding dengan organisasi-organisasi Islamis lainnya. Namun, dalam diri PKS ada keterlanjutan dan keterputusan ideologi Islamisme. Keterlanjutan Islamisme PKS dapat dilihat dari kesalihan ritual-individual yang digali dari khasanah keagamaan klasik yang sangat selektif. Sementara itu, keterputusannya terletak pada keengganan PKS untuk menganut paradigma revolusioner dalam melakukan transformasi sosial. Selain itu, PKS lebih memilih terjun langsung ke arena politik yang dianggap oleh sebagian kalangan Islamis sebagai tempat kotor yang harus dijauhi.

Tulisan ini menyoroiti fenomena mutakhir yang ditampilkan PKS melalui platform dan praktik politik yang bercirikan optimisme dan kemauan untuk terlibat dalam proses transformasi sosial-politik. Tulisan ini berangkat dari argumen dasar bahwa kemauan PKS melakukan transformasi sosial-politik secara evolusioner tidak terjadi begitu saja. Kegagalan generasi tua dari kalangan Islamis menjadi salah satu alasan penting mengapa PKS memilih berganti haluan. Ia tidak mengadopsi paradigma revolusioner sebagaimana dianut kelompok Islamis lainnya. Kalangan aktivis PKS, yang pada mulanya berasal dari kelompok pengajian Tarbiyah kampus, "bercerai" dari mainstream Islamisme lain. PKS memilih merestorasi kebobrokan moral masyarakat dan negara dengan terlibat langsung dari "dalam" dengan menerima demokrasi sebagai satu-satunya aturan main yang paling mungkin bisa diterapkan di masyarakat plural seperti Indonesia.

Untuk mewujudkan platform politiknya, PKS merancang tradisi demokrasi yang disesuaikan dengan nilai-nilai moral-normatif yang dianutnya sendiri. Kalangan aktifis partai ini hendak menegaskan kepada publik bahwa ummat Islam bisa maju dan modern tanpa harus menghancurkan fundamental keagamaan mereka. Paradigma kompromistis semacam ini terlihat dari program-program politik yang disesuaikan dengan standard good governance yang berpijak pada fundamen-fundamen kesalihan individual dan sosial. Inilah yang disebut pendekatan "Mawdu-

dian-meliorist", sebuah karakter politik yang berusaha membangun tanpa harus menghancurkan tatanan yang sudah ada. Kesalihan atau salafisme di satu sisi, dikawatirkan dengan pragmatisme politik, di sisi lain. Praktik politik yang sama juga ditunjukkan Ikhtwanul Muslimin (IM) di Mesir, partai Refah di Turki, serta partai Hamas di Palestina. Hal senada juga terjadi di kalangan Kristen Eropa dengan kemunculan Christian Democratic Party.

Namun, yang relevan untuk diangkat di sini adalah konteks dinamika politik lokal-nasional yang melatari kehadiran PKS dalam percaturan politik global yang diwarnai sejumlah aksi kekerasan berlatar agama. Dialektika semacam ini memaksa PKS mereformulasi kembali sejumlah doktrin politik yang selama ini dipegangi oleh sebagian Islamis dan sempat menjadi pusat perdebatan publik seperti konsep Negara Islam, penerapan shari'ah Islam, Piagam Jakarta vs. Piagam Madinah, dan sejenisnya. Dalam hal metodologi pergerakan, memang kehadiran PKS banyak diinspirasi oleh IM. Namun demikian, warna PKS pada akhirnya cenderung ditentukan oleh karakter melioris partai ini yang akomodatif, kompromistis dan eklektis. Kehadirannya menjadi penanda perceraian dari mainstream Islamisme Qutbian-uopian yang cenderung radikal dan sikap tanpa kompromi sebagai jalan menempuh perjuangannya.

Begitu pula tidak seperti gerakan Islamisme Qutbian-utopian yang menganggap demokrasi dan paham-paham modern lainnya sebagai musuh dan berhalal modern, PKS berusaha mengapresiasi paham-paham modern semacam ini sebagai sebuah keharusan tanpa harus tercerabut dari identitas primordial keislaman. Dalam pandangan politik PKS, tidak ada alasan yang kuat untuk memisahkan Islam dari demokrasi, karena pada dasarnya Islam sangat sejalan dengan prinsip-prinsip demokrasi yang universal seperti keadilan dan kesederajatan. Hanya saja, PKS tidak menghendaki pemaksaan penerapan demokrasi partikular yang cocok di sejumlah negara tertentu ke dalam struktur masyarakat Muslim yang memiliki karakteristik yang berbeda. Sejumlah aktifis PKS berargumen, pemisahan agama dari politik justru menghilangkan misi profetik ajaran agama yang hendak memperbaiki struktur sosial-politik yang bobrok secara moral.

Dilihat dari perspektif ini, PKS merepresentasikan satu persilangan baru, semacam tempat pertemuan sejumlah pandangan keagamaan yang berbeda. Ini berfungsi sebagai jembatan ideologis yang menghubungkan dua paham keagamaan yang berbeda antara sejumlah organisasi sosial-politik semacam Muhammadiyah dan NU yang loyalitas komitmennya terhadap demokrasi tidak diragukan lagi, dan sejumlah organisasi Islamis lainnya yang lebih ekstrem dalam menolak demokrasi, di sisi lain. Politik eklektik menjadi pilihan yang tidak terhindarkan. Dalam konteks ini, PKS menerapkan pandangan-pandangan politik dan intelektual dari banyak sumber sepanjang dapat memperkaya dan memperkuat basis intelektual gerakan, baik dari kalangan ideolog-intelektual internasional maupun dalam negeri.

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: A Mawdudian-Meliorist Vision of Islamism in Post-New Order Indonesia

الخلاصة: تعتبر مشاركة حزب العدالة الرفاهية في نظام السياسية الحزبية مرحلة جديدة في المسيرة الإسلامية بإندونيسيا. هذا الحزب يمثل شكلا جديدا للإسلام السياسي الذي جاء بنوع فريد إذا قرن بالتنظيمات الإسلامية الأخرى. لكن في داخل الحزب يوجد الواقعان وهما واقع التواصل وواقع الانقطاع في الأيدولوجية الإسلامية، وفي الواقع التواصل يمثل الحزب في إخلاص أنصاره للعبادة المبنية على المصادر الدينية التراثية المنتخبة بينما في واقع الانقطاع يتمثل في موقفه الممتنع عن الفكرة الثورية في إصلاح المجتمع ، ويفضل مشاركة مباشرة في السياسة التي يعتبرها البعض ساحة القدر.

ينظر هذا البحث إلى ظاهرة الحزب السائدة من خلال الأعمال السياسية التي تتسم بالتفاؤل والرغبة في عملية إصلاح المجال الاجتماعي والسياسي. يبنى على المبررات الأساسية للحزب القائلة بأن هذه الرغبة لم تأت بالصدفة وأن فشل الأجيال السابقة من الإسلاميين هو الذي جعله سببا في اختياره الطريق المختلف عنهم. والحزب لم يتمسك بالفكرة الثورية كما يتمسك بها الآخرون. وفي البداية كان الحزب مجرد مجموعة للدراسة التريية داخل الجامعة وانفصل عن التيار الإسلامي الآخر. ثم وضع نفسه على إصلاح الأخلاق الفاسدة في المجتمع والدولة بمشاركة مباشرة من خلال قبوله على مبدأ الديمقراطية باعتبارها طريقا واحدا معترفا لدى الجميع في المجتمع التعددي مثل إندونيسيا .

في تحقيق أهدافه السياسية، يسلك الحزب طريق الديمقراطية المتفق مع القيم والمبادئ التي يتمسك بها، ويؤكد أنصاره للجميع أن للمسلمين قدرة على التقدم والتحديث دون التعارض مع أساسيات دينهم. وظاهرة هذا التوفيق تتمثل في برنامجه السياسية على أساس نظرية الحكومة الصالحة التي

تقوم على أفراد صالحة وجمتمع صالح. هذا ما يطلق عليه بمودودية ميلبورست" هو نوعية سياسية تحاول على البناء لا على الهدم. ويندمج فيه الاتجاه السلفي من ناحية و الوقائع السياسية من ناحية أخرى. هو نفس الطريقة السياسية التي ينتهجها إخوان المسلمين في جمهورية مصر العربية وحزب الرفاه في الترك وحزب "حماس" في فلسطين. كذلك في الأوروبية المسيحية حيث ظهر فيه حزب الديمقراطية المسيحية.

لا بد أن نلاحظ أن هناك التطور في السياسة القومية الذي أدى إلى ظهور الحزب وفي إطار السياسة الدولية التي اتسمت بالعنف باسم الدين. مما يضطر الحزب على إعادة النظر في تشكيل نظرياته السياسية التي تتمسك بها بعض الإسلاميين والتي تثير الجدل الواسع بين الناس مثل فكرة الدولة الإسلامية، وتطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية، ووثيقة جاكارتا مقابل وثيقة المدينة وغيرها. من ناحية منهج الحركة يتأثر الحزب بإخوان المسلمين لكن في النهاية يتأثر بالمودودية التي تميل إلى التسامح والتوفيق والمرونة. على ذلك يتضح لنا أن الحزب ابتعد عن التطرف الإسلامي الذي يميل إلى العنف وعدم المرونة في كفاحه.

كذلك أن الحزب لم يكن مثل حركة التطرف الإسلامي التي تعتبر الديمقراطية والنظريات الحديثة أعداء له والأصنام المعاصرة، لكنه يحاول أن ينظر إلى هذه النظريات الحديثة كأمر ضروري دون المساس بهويته الإسلامية. وفي نظر الحزب، لا يوجد مبرر وجيه في تفريق الإسلام من الديمقراطية، لأن الإسلام عامة يتمشى مع المبادئ الديمقراطية العالمية مثل مبدأ العدالة والمساواة. لكنه لا يريد تطبيق الديمقراطية الغربية إجباريا على المجتمع الإسلامي الذي له قيم خاصة به. ويرى بعض أنصار الحزب أن الفصل بين الدين والسياسة يؤدي إلى فقدان الرسالة الإلهية الهادفة إلى إصلاح المجتمع الفاسد أخلاقيا.

بناء على ذلك، أن الحزب يقدم لنا امتزاجا جديدا بين العديد من الفكر الدينية المختلفة. ويلعب دور الجسر الفكري الذي يربط الاتجاهين المتباينين عند مجموعة التنظيمات السياسية والاجتماعية مثل المحمدية ونهضة العلماء المتمسكين دون شك بالديمقراطية من ناحية والتنظيمات الأخرى التي ترفض الديمقراطية من ناحية أخرى. والسياسة التفوقية أصبحت اختيارا ضروريا في هذا الصدد. ومن هنا أن الحزب يقبل على النظرات السياسية والفكرية التي تأتي من المصادر المختلف سواء كانت من داخل البلاد أم من خارجها، ما دامت تساهم على إثراء الأساسيات الفكرية للحزب وتعزيزها له.

Socio-political developments in post-New Order Indonesia have been dominated by a growth in Islamic activism. The multifaceted crisis created by the failures and subsequent fall of the New Order regime provided an immediate opportunity for Islamists to propagate the return to “pristine” Islam as a solution to the country’s problems. While there has been an evident decline in support for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia since the middle of the last century,¹ the wave of democracy has in fact provided Islamists with greater freedom to express their ideas more openly in public. The rise of Islamist activism, many argue, has culminated in such acts of violence perpetrated by Muslim hardliners as the Bali bombing in 2002 and 2005, the Marriot Hotel blast in 2003, and the Australian embassy in 2004. Some observers even argue that Indonesia has become a haven for Muslim terrorists.²

While many – if not most – Indonesians would like to distance themselves from Islamism, the fact of the matter is that it is a product of Indonesia’s socio-political circumstances. These circumstances have evidently shaped the ideological direction of some segments of the Indonesian Muslim community, and radical ideas have been the result. Indonesian Islam is by no means homogeneous; Indonesian Muslims come in all shapes and sizes, from tolerant, moderate, and liberal to extremely intolerant and radical. This does not mean that there exists a vast divide between the moderates and the radicals; while the violent measures resorted to by some radical groups are widely condemned and rejected as morally wrong by the majority, the motives which give rise to such radical ideas and actions are generally understood and at times enjoy tacit sympathy, even amongst Muslims who would have to be considered “moderate.”³

The term “Islamism” could be explained as follows. First, its proponents tend to interpret Islam, based on the Qur’an and Hadith (Prophet’s tradition), literally. Islamists believe that Islam is the only solution for any type of crisis faced by Muslims since it is complete and perfect, applicable to all times and places (*ṣāliḥ li-kulli zamān wa makān*).⁴ Second, they tend to be reactive towards whatever they perceive as corrupted, immoral, and deviant in the religion and seek to moralise it by returning to their version of Islam. They would see the corrupted Muslim community as the field for their call for a return to an “authentic” version of Islam on the basis of a peaceful and persuasive approach.

Given those characteristics, we cannot clearly distinguish peaceful Islamism from radical-violent Islamism. In this context, Greg Fealy argues that Islamism cannot be placed in an isolated category, and thus clearly demarcated from “moderate” or “liberal” Muslims.⁵ Islamist views can often also be held by “moderate” Muslims and can gain broad support within some mainstream Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Despite their reputation as “moderate” organizations, some segments of these organizations are surprisingly sympathetic to key points of the Islamists’ agenda. That is why their rhetoric can at times be remarkably similar to that of Islamist groups.⁶

This article seeks to analyse how one group, that is, the Justice and Welfare Party (PKS), is attempting to clean up politics from within the political party system. This article argues that the existence of PKS has given a new but unique political nuance to the political party system in post-New Order Indonesia. The seemingly sudden rise of PKS has taken many by surprise, and it is for this that the party has become the topic of much discourse amongst scholars of Indonesia.

PKS: Making the World a Better Place

PKS, established on 20 April 2002 in Jakarta, is one of the newcomers to the political scene in post-New Order Indonesia. Nevertheless, its performance on the political stage has been quite impressive as it achieved massive gains very quickly among Muslim voters. Originally founded as “Partai Keadilan” (Justice Party/PK) on 20 July 1998, the party owes its support mainly to Muslim activists in secular university campuses spread across the country.

Unlike other Islamist groups – such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (The Council of Indonesian Muslim Fighters, or MMI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (The Liberation Party of Indonesia, or HTI), and Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front) — that opt for extra-parliamentarian struggles and are utopian and revolutionary in vision, PKS is convinced that cleaning up politics can be done from within the political party system through a step-by-step evolution. This political vision is mainly inherited from Mawdudi’s non-revolutionary, integrative political standpoint.

The attribution of PKS to Mawdudi’s political vision does not, however, mean that the party has completely adopted the ideas of Mawdudi. PKS is not the verbatim replica of Mawdudi’s polit-

ical standpoint. In an organizational sense, the party is very much influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*), especially the thinking of Hassan Al-Banna. Mawdudi's idea of Islamic theocracy is not fully supported by PKS in the Indonesian context. The party firmly claims to subscribe fully to democracy, even though in practice this might not always be the case. The similarities between PKS and Mawdudian thinking lay in the following aspects of their respective political approaches: (1) PKS activists consider politics to be holy and as a field of *dakwah* (preaching, propagation) and *'ibādah* (worship); (2) both advocate ideas of *al-shumulīyat al-Islām*, the belief of the all-encompassing nature of Islam as a religion (*al-dīn*) and statehood (*al-dawlah*); and (3) the Islamization of the state in which sovereignty is for God only, while *Sharī'ah* should be implemented. Furthermore, in disseminating their ideas, PKS always reinforces the use of peaceful means.⁷

Meliorism, developed along the context of the debates of religious ethics in the aftermath of World War I, essentially argues that the world can be a better place without necessarily destroying the existing socio-political orders. It basically condemns the existing world as "a sorry state of affairs," and affirms with confident assurance the ability of human intelligence to terminate it. Its advocates a practical motto: "Let us make a better world!" Meliorists are militant yet not necessarily radical in a pejorative sense, as they do not propagate the use of violence in the process of social transformation. More importantly, they look at the reality of the world positively.⁸ The basic assumption of meliorism is that:

The appearance of man was expressed in terms of struggle, and his history was said to consist of efforts to improve his status by acquiring greater control over the various elements constituting his environment and thus affecting his security and well-being. Thus the emphasis was shifted from possession to endeavour; from worship to work; from a sense of belonging to a wider order of reality and sharing in its life and spirit to a concern for remoulding the world wherever it thwarted desire.⁹

Meliorism has a lot to do with human efforts on the grounds of religious causes; it is about wrapping up human progress in the world of materialism by religious spirit that distinguishes itself from pragmatism, instrumentalism, and realism, which are secular in tone. In the minds of meliorists, religion provides a pro-

phetic code of conduct for its believers. In this context, religion in general is widely perceived of as a consciousness of the highest social values. On the other hand, being irreligious becomes a state of indifference or hostility to that which promotes human well-being.¹⁰

The main mission of PKS is twofold; the first is a general mission, namely, "as a *dakwah* party [and] the upholder of justice and prosperity in the framework of the unity of the *ummah* and nation." The second is to make the party "politically influential through participation and opinions, aimed at realizing Indonesia as a *madani* [civil] society."¹¹ The vision of the party is as follows:

1. Disseminating Islamic *dakwah* and developing its cadres to become the element of change (*anāsir taghyīr*).
2. Developing Islamic social institutions as the centres of change (*markaz taghyīr*).
3. Constructing an Islamic general opinion and propitious circumstances for the implementation of Islamic teachings as a solution and as a blessing for the entire universe (*rahmatan lil 'ālamīn*).
4. Building political awareness among the society, and carrying out the protection, service and empowerment of their rights of citizenship.
5. Upholding consistently and continuously the "commanding right and forbidding wrong" (*amar ma'rūf nahī munkar*) to the powers-that-be in the framework of Islamic law and ethics.
6. Being active in communicating, visiting (*silaturahmi*), collaborating and reforming (*islāh*) various elements of the society and Muslim community for the sake of establishing *ukhuwwah Islāmīyah* (solidarity in Islam) and *wiḥdah al-ummah* (the unity of the Muslim community), and other components of the nation to bolster togetherness in realizing the agenda of reformation.
7. Taking part in providing a positive contribution to upholding justice and rejecting despotism, particularly towards oppressed Muslim countries.¹²

In the 1999 elections, the party won 1.4% of the total vote and seven seats in the national House of Representatives (DPR). PK emerged from *dakwah* movements such as the Muslim Student Action Union (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia* / KAMMI) and the Tarbiyah Movement.¹³ Since PK did not meet the 2% threshold that would allow it to take part in the next election, the party

transformed itself into "Partai Keadilan Sejahtera." In the following general election in 2004, the party achieved a remarkable increase to 7.34% of the vote and 45 seats in the DPR, an unbelievable achievement for a newcomer. This means that the party was chosen by as many as 8.3 million voters all over the country during the 2004 elections.¹⁴ The remarkable success of PKS in the 2004 elections can be put down to its strategy of downplaying Islamic issues and instead articulating more popular and, importantly, more secular themes during the campaign, "*Bersih dan Peduli*" (Clean and Caring).¹⁵ This theme was extended into a more eye-catching slogan, "Clean National Leadership from Corruption and Care for the People." Evidently the party seeks to show society in general that the party is distancing itself from the implementation of Islamic *shari'a*, something they consider less important than dealing with the multidimensional crisis inflicting the country. On many occasions, they even seem to avoid such controversial issues as the implementation of *shari'a*, which is considered to be unmarketable to the public.

Analysing the direction of PKS has to be directly linked to analysing its manifesto and program before it transformed itself from PK into PKS. At that time, there were seven main characteristics of the party:

1. Moralistic; the party strives for the healing of Indonesia through the moral values of Islam.
2. Professional; its cadres are well-prepared to master modern science and technology before immersing themselves into the restoration of Indonesia.
3. Patriotic; PK's cadres define the spirit of the struggle for the sake of the betterment of mankind and gaining God's mercy.
4. Moderate; the party defines this term as choosing an in-between position, even though this attitude was objected to by some other more puritan party's activists.
5. Democratic; which is defined as the capacity of human beings to determine their own destiny which is believed to be deeply rooted in the Islamic tradition of *Shūrā*.
6. Reformist, by which the party refers to any attitude towards the betterment and restoration of society, and not vice versa.
7. Independent, which is defined by the party as freedom from any form of oppression and colonialism.¹⁶

The manifesto (*Anggaran Dasar* / AD) and program of PK differ from those of PKS. While PK's manifesto and program did not mention Pancasila at all, the PKS's manifesto does mention it explicitly, albeit not as the foundation [which is Islam] of the party, but under the article of purpose. It is said that "*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera adalah Partai Dakwah yang bertujuan mewujudkan masyarakat yang adil dan sejahtera yang diridhai Allah Subhanahu Wata'ala, dalam Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia yang berdasarkan Pancasila*" [Partai Keadilan Sejahtera is a *dakwah* party that aims to realize a just and prosperous society under God's mercy, within the framework of Unitary State of Indonesia with Pancasila as its foundation].¹⁷ This statement seems to ensure that the party wishes to compromise the two important words which have stood in diametrical opposition to each other throughout Indonesian history: Islam and Pancasila.

As soon as PK was established, the party launched a number of public-oriented programs which dealt with the economy, politics, law, education, science and technology, local governance, society, and womanhood.¹⁸ Basically, there was no fundamental difference between these programs and those offered by other political parties. They were, however, given an Islamist flavour. In the field of economics, for instance, developing a non-interest economic system was considered as the solution for the economic crisis. In the field of politics, moral values were given more prominence at a practical level by promoting good and clean governance and public accountability based on Islamic precepts.

Soon after the party changed its title to PKS, the various programs were broken down into nine priorities as a solution to the current problems faced by the country. Later on these programs became known as the Nine 'K's:

1. *Korupsi dan Penyalahgunaan Kewenangan* (Corruption and the abuse of power);
2. *Kemiskinan dan Pengangguran* (Poverty and unemployment);
3. *Kebodohan* (Illiteracy or ignorance) as a result of the low quality of education and science and technology;
4. *Kriminalitas dan Kerawanan Sosial* (Crime and social insecurity);
5. *Konflik dan Kekerasan* (Conflict and violence);
6. *Keretakan Nasional dan Ancaman Disintegrasi Bangsa* (National disunity and the threat of national disintegration);
7. *Ketergantungan pada dominasi asing* (Dependence on foreign domination);

8. *Kelemahan Kepemimpinan* (Leadership weaknesses);
9. *Kerusakan etika dan budaya* (Ethics and culture damages).¹⁹

Despite its reputation as a newcomer, the roots of PKS can be traced back to several Muslim organizations such as Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia, or DDII) and Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (The Indonesian Committee for World Muslim Solidarity, KISDI), or even Masyumi. These organizations, directly or indirectly, inspired the establishment of PK. Some even argue that the establishment of PK marked a formal split with DDII and KISDI.²⁰

Crafting Islamic Democracy: The New Era of Political Islam

It must be emphasized from the outset that although PKS does not explicitly carry the name of Islam on its name, it is considered an Islamic party. At the time the party was established, the Tarbiyah Movement was a closed movement whose members were carefully selected and inducted into a program designed to ensure religious piety. The party was founded by some of the leaders of the Tarbiyah Movement following Soeharto's fall in 1998.²¹ Much of its support came from campus-based Islamist groups and young graduates who had been active in Tarbiyah circles. According to Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, the decision of some Tarbiyah leaders in 1998 to form PK(S) was a reaction to the freer political atmosphere resulting from the fall of the Soeharto regime, facilitated by the belief that it was now time to move into a new stage of development, one that focused on formal politics and popular appeal as a means of furthering their objectives.²² By the time of the 1999 election, PK claimed to have about 60,000 members. When the party announced its re-formation under the new name PKS in mid-2003, it already had more than 300,000 members. The party consciously recruited members from a non-Tarbiyah background to broaden its appeal and, at the 2004 election, fielded more than 30 non-Muslim legislative candidates.²³

While Tarbiyah members regarded the Islamization of society, the economy, and state as a cornerstone of their struggle, PKS downplayed these issues in the 1999 and 2004 elections, emphasizing instead "secular" themes such as fighting corruption, socio-economic equality and the need for clean and good governance.²⁴

Party leaders made clear that their stance on these issues was informed by their Islamic norms, but they usually conveyed their electoral messages in religiously neutral rhetoric. This was not to say that PKS leaders had abandoned their earlier commitment to the Islamist causes; rather they argued that it was premature and ultimately counter-productive to take such issues to the broader electorate.²⁵ Most voters, they believed, had a poor understanding of Brotherhood principles and PKS did not want to risk being labelled sectarian or radical if it promoted such an agenda. Thus, PKS's constitution and manifesto made no explicit mention of establishing an Islamic state.²⁶

It has to be acknowledged that, to a certain extent, a democratic element has been behind the establishment of PKS, since it was founded on the basis of a democratic poll of over 6,000 students and alumni of the KAMMI network.²⁷ However, the extent to which the idea of democracy has been appreciated by the party's cadres and activists is another question. There are of course disagreements within PKS as a result of the tension between Islamist causes and a commitment to democracy. For some PKS leaders, such as Fachry Hamzah, a former KAMMI leader, who is now a PKS member of parliament, the party's true political objective is a state based on Islamic law. He maintained that "Today democracy is our playing field, but we cannot abandon our religious ambitions."²⁸ On the other hand, this party can be seen as the bridging ground between radical Islamists and Muslim organizations which are committed to democracy. Elizabeth F. Collins and Ihsan Ali Fauzi, for instance, acknowledge the party as being "a moderate alternative to radical Islamism."²⁹ This can be seen by the fact that the founders of PKS are supporting democracy, ironically because democracy provides a way to establish an Islamic government. They say time and again that there is no necessary contradiction between Islam and democracy. Hidayat Nur Wahid, the then party's chairman, who is now the chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly (Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/MPR), has tried to position PKS as a "centrist Islamist party" that occupies the middle ground between radical Islamist groups that reject democracy on the one hand, and Muslim organizations committed to democracy, on the other.³⁰ In his view, there is a broad variety of Islamist groups, ranging from radical Salafi groups which are open to the use of violence to old Masyumi activists, including those who support the Jakarta Char-

ter and who would impose Islamic law on Muslims, to moderate civil society groups committed to democratic values like for example the big mass organizations Muhammadiyah and NU.³¹

As far as the party's formal constitution is concerned, democracy is mentioned as one of the spirits of the party.³² What PKS means by democracy is its acceptance of universal and basic values of democracy as a reflection of the capacity of mankind as *khalifatullah* (God's vicegerent) on earth to determine its own destiny.³³ One of the forms of democracy, that is, people's participation in electoral politics, should be appreciated but must not go against the basic principle of *shūrā* (deliberation, consultation). *Shūrā* is a system dealing with how power is managed in a certain state or society whose values are derived from the Qur'an.³⁴

Some observers have responded positively to the performance of PKS. Bubalo and Fealy, for instance, praise PKS for its achievements thus far as a positive contribution to the process of democratization in Indonesia.³⁵ This party is said to have offered a new paradigm of political behaviour and greater electoral choices generating an alternative to the oligarchic structures that tend to underpin autocratic regimes. In this regard, the role that PKS has played is an actual demonstration of how Islamists and/or Islamism can sometimes assist in a process of democratization. Not all types of Islamism have a destructive effect on political life. In their evaluation, the party's distinctiveness is a direct consequence of its Brotherhood-derived ideology and norms. Although the party has adapted its ideology to fit Indonesian political conditions, its core frame of reference, in Bubalo and Fealy's opinion, remains that of the Brotherhood. Viewed from this perspective, it can be argued that this particular form of Middle Eastern influence has by and large had a positive impact on Indonesian political life.³⁶

R. William Liddle has also praised the positive contribution made by PKS to the process of democratization in Indonesia, following its success in the 2004 elections. In his opinion, one of the factors that made PKS successful on the political stage is the fact that this party used a double-standard strategy in its campaigns.³⁷ As a cadre party, PKS implemented stringent religious values and a set of moral standards to be obeyed by its members. Interestingly, the members and activists of this party were buoyed by the enchantment of Islamic ideology, which resulted in a strong

commitment to maintain high moral standards in politics. The same enchantment cannot be found in other Islamic parties or Muslim-based parties such as PKB, PAN, and PBB. In other words, they used religion for “in door” purposes. Outwardly, however, this party employed a religiously neutral language, focusing on issues such as overcoming poverty, anti-corruption, clean governance, and distribution of justice, in order to appeal to a wider electorate.

PKS was fully aware that the use of Islamic issues such as the application of *shari'ah* would be counter-productive and could be rejected by the society. What the people needed was real action how to deal with the plight of the common people (*wong cilik*). It took the issue of the neglected *wong cilik* to be the main theme of its political campaign to gain its high profile. It could attract the public's attention by presenting itself as a moral reform party which was able to distinguish itself from the political status-quo. In 2003 PKS issued a campaign statement entitled “24 Alasan PKS sebagai Musuh Wong Licik” (24 Reasons why PKS is the Enemy of Slippery Characters) and “15 Alasan PKS sebagai Sahabat Wong Cilik” (15 Reasons why PKS is the Friend of Ordinary People) based on clippings about PKS representatives who refused to be involved in corruption. To cite just one example, in 2003 the South Sumatra Provincial Legislature voted to disburse Rp. 7.5 billion (US\$ 900,000) from the Provincial Operating Budget to the 75 members of the provincial legislature. Only the PKS representative refused to take his cut. When newspapers picked up the story, the resulting scandal forced the other legislators to return the money.³⁸ This strategy proved to be successful during PKS' campaign. The success of this strategy can be seen in the marked swell of its vote in the 2004 elections, in which PKS was able to gain 7.34 percent of the vote or 8.3 million votes, up from 1.36 percent of the vote or 679,178 voters in the 1999 election (see Tables 1 and 2 below). In Jakarta, PKS even became the strongest party.³⁹ The number of the party's cadres has increased steeply, from 5,000 core cadres and 42,000 supporting cadres in 1999 to 25,000 core cadres and 400,000 supporting cadres.⁴⁰

Table 1
Total Votes of Islamic and/or Muslim Based Parties in the 1999 election

No.	Party	Votes	%	Seats in DPR
1.	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	13,336,823	12.62	51
2.	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	11,329,905	10.72	58
3.	Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)	7,488,956	7.12	34
4.	Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)	2,069,708	1.94	13
5.	Partai Keadilan (PK)	1,436,563	1.36	7
6.	PPNU	679,178	0.64	5
7.	Others	3,417,592	3.21	4
	TOTAL	39,758,725	37.61	172

Source: Final announcement of the 1999 election result by the KPU (General Elections Commission). Total vote for the elections was 105,846,000.

Table 2
Total Votes of Islamic and/or Muslim Based Parties in the 2004 election

No.	Party	Votes	%	Seats in DPR
1.	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	11,989,564	10.57	52
2.	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	9,248,764	8.15	58
3.	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)	8,325,020	7.34	45
4.	Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)	7,303,324	6.44	52
5.	Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)	2,970,487	2.62	11
6.	Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR)	2,764,998	2.44	13
7.	Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ulama (PPNU)	895,610	0.79	-
	TOTAL	43,497,767	38.35	231

Source: KPU's final announcement of legislative election results, released 5 May 2004. The total votes considered legal were 113,462,414 of the total voters of 124,449,038.

Martin van Bruinessen is another scholar who has been impressed by the performance of PKS. Indeed, he considers it as the most rational and rationalized party in the Indonesian political system – in a Weberian sense.⁴¹ While the party does not depend

on primordial loyalties but on merit and political ideas, its leaders are refreshingly uncharismatic, one of the important characteristics of a modern party. In terms of developing democratic elements in Indonesia, van Bruinessen also praises the party as "imperfect democrats but perhaps Indonesia's strongest force for democratization."⁴² He further argues that PKS is:

...One of the very few forces in the political arena that may seriously contribute to a gradual democratization of the country. One of the most obvious reasons is that the party believes in participation in the existing political system and in changing society through persuasion of individuals rather than through grabbing power... It is not the party's theoretical ideas about divine versus human sovereignty that will determine its democratic performance but its acceptance of the rules of the game and the fact that it is rational and rationalized organization.⁴³

In its practice if not in its discourse it is moderate and patient, and it accepts pluralism as a given. PKS's political manifesto endorses democracy based on popular sovereignty on principle, except where this is explicitly in conflict with divine command. Van Bruinessen also acknowledges PKS's openness for women to participate equally in public life, since the manifesto explicitly includes women among those who should be equal.

Despite its achievements, however, PKS performances have also drawn criticism. The double-standard strategy adopted by the party is one of the aspects Bubalo and Fealy criticize.⁴⁴ In their opinion, PKS has frequently cultivated a public image of itself which is basically at odds with internal discourses.⁴⁵ While its spokespersons have stressed the party's commitment to pluralism and tolerance, PKS training documents and websites indicate a far more militant stream of thinking among many of its branches. They also criticize PKS's choice of legislative candidates in the 2004 election. The most controversial of these was Tamsil Linrung who was nominated by PKS in South Sulawesi despite his alleged connections to several violent Islamic organizations, including *Jema'ah Islamiyah* (JI), and his disrespectful reputation for financial mismanagement. Another notorious case is one of PKS's representatives in parliament, Soeripto, a former senior intelligence officer, who was under investigation for corruption during Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency and who has gained a high profile by promulgating inelegant conspiracy theories about Western involvement in contemporary terrorist acts.⁴⁶

Another of PKS's negative dimensions is the fact that the anti-Zionist rhetoric is commonplace among many of its members, as are various theories regarding global schemes to subjugate Muslims. A closer look at the curriculum used by the cadres in Tarbiyah training reveals this tendency.⁴⁷ In this curriculum, there are at least four subjects taught that could promote such thinking and attitudes: (1) *ghazw al-fikr* (war of thought); (2) International Zionism; (3) Disguised movements that oppose Islam; and (4) Institutions that fight Islam.⁴⁸ Such a destructive attitude is mainly derived from the essentialist approach developed within the circle of Tarbiyah gatherings by uncritically exploiting some Qur'anic verses without the attempts of reinterpretation. The oft-cited textual reference in building such anti-Zionist attitudes is taken from the Qur'an, verse 2:120, "Never will the Jews or the Christians be satisfied with you until you follow their religion." This verse is then arbitrarily deployed as the only framework in reading current global politics with particular reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the unilateral policies of the US.

Conspiracy theories also preoccupy the minds of some of the party's activists. For example, Hidayat Nur Wahid's comment on the second Bali bombing in 2005 was another absurd case in point. Instead of considering the possibilities of another Islamic terrorist attack, he blamed the bombings on rivalries within the local tourism industry.⁴⁹ It is also alleged that some of PKS's activists (or supporters) were involved in several acts of vandalism of the headquarters and mosques belonging to Ahmadiyah, a sect accused of being deviant from "true Islam" by the Indonesian Ulama Council (*Majlis Ulama Indonesia*/MUI) in October 2005.⁵⁰ This is due largely to the ongoing appeal of the ideology of physical jihad against God's enemies, notably those non-Muslims fighting against fellow Muslims. Many cadres and activists argue that fighting jihad against non-Muslims is a part of their religious duty if it is undertaken appropriately, like for defensive purposes in a given conflict area. The branch leader of PKS in Ambon, Abdullah Daeng Matta, for example, was killed in a conflict zone in April 2004 and was considered by his fellow party members as a *shahīd* (martyr).⁵¹

In a similar tone, Fuller Collins criticizes PKS as a cadre-based closed party that has no interest in recruiting a mass following ignorant of Islamic principles.⁵² The most legendary motto is that of Sayyid Qutb's "*nakhtalitūn walakin natamayyazūn*" (interaction

with the society but not immersed in them).⁵³ The succession process is also conducted in a closed and authoritarian manner because it is controlled by the Advisory Council (*Majlīs Shūrā*), a supreme body consisting of several unelected respected figures. Collins argues further that the structure of the party is not fully democratic because the *Majlīs Shūrā* plays a central role in directing the party. The separation of power within PKS into *Majlīs Shūrā* and *Tanfidhiyah* is reminiscent of the similar system within the political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in which the executive is controlled by a supreme body called *vilayat-e-faqih* (body of religious clerics). This undemocratic system can sometimes undermine a healthy power relation between the superior body and the inferior one. It can lead to the absence of checks and balance mechanisms in executing the state policies.

Similar to previous criticisms, van Bruinessen has also expressed his concern about the subscription of some PKS leaders to the belief in anti-Islamic conspiracies.⁵⁴ In his opinion, PKS is clearly not a liberal party and its vision of society clashes at some points with liberal democratic values. He also points to the oddity as raised in the party's documents between the *sharī'ah* and democracy, something that can lead to the assumption that the party has at best embraced the procedural elements of democracy. Doubts may also linger as to its real views on the position of non-Muslim minorities and the party's views on *hudūd* punishments: will non-Muslim minorities be accepted as fully equal citizens or will they be protected but essentially treated unequally? Does the party aspire to have the *hudūd* punishments enacted in a distant future? Last but not least van Bruinessen predicts the party is unlikely ever to become a big party, due particularly to its insistence on the quality rather than the quantity of its members.⁵⁵

Having said all of that, van Bruinessen acknowledges that PKS contributes to the process of democratization in the country.⁵⁶ One obvious reason behind this, he argues further, is the fact that unlike other Islamist groups, the party believes in electoral politics and in social transformation through gradual methods such as dialogue and persuasion. In addition to being moderate in practice, if not in its discourse, the party also accepts pluralism as taken for granted. The party's acceptance of democracy can also be seen from its manifesto which mentions explicitly the word "democracy" as one of the principles it embraces, except where this is explicitly in conflict with divine command.⁵⁷ This stance shows clear-

ly that the party is at odds with other Qutbīan-utopian Islamists who will always place the divine will above the will of the people, and thus consider democracy as sinful hubris.

A far harsher criticism is expounded by Sadanand Dhume, a former Jakarta-based correspondent of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* and *The Asian Wall Street Journal*. In one of his columns, he stigmatized the image of PKS as “Indonesian Democracy’s Enemy Within,” a predisposition he advocated to depict the party’s imminent threat to democracy in Indonesia.⁵⁸ In an article published in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, he recklessly lumped PKS together with Jama’ah Islamiyah in terms of “having subscribed to the same fundamentally anti-modern worldview,” an argument which is empirically unfounded.⁵⁹ Dhume maintains that the PKS’s moderate mode was less than its strategy to avoid the backlash as experienced by its counterpart of Egypt, the Brotherhood. He says that “the party’s leaders tend to couch their statements in ambiguity designed to calm Western and secular Indonesian fears while at the same time reassuring the party’s base about its goals – the Islamization of Indonesian society with the ultimate goal of imposing a state based on *sharīah* law.”⁶⁰ He believes that the implementation of the seventh-century cruel punishment of Islamic *sharīah* is a matter of time when this party is in power. “Sooner or later,” he goes on to argue, “Indonesia’s cultural pluralism – a cheerful acceptance of Taiwanese pop groups, Japanese Hello Kitty dolls and Bollywood movies – will run up against the Justice Party’s drab fidelity to Arab culture alone.”⁶¹

From Political Islam to Islamic Politics: Towards a New Paradigm

For Muslims, political activity is not to gain power but to serve the people. Power is not an end in itself. So we aim not to twist arms or stab in the back those who aspire to serve, but to cooperate... We do not aim to lead the nation to poverty and backwardness. Good causes are achieved through good means... We will continue to campaign on a platform of fighting corruption, violence and injustice, and to uphold Islamic values – the values that have been abused – within a framework of national unity and integrity.⁶²

The above statement perhaps reflects the very spirit of PKS’s identity. The party wishes to prove to the public that politics is not necessarily a dirty area in which the Machiavellian slogan “ends justify means” becomes the only hallmark. PKS wants to alleviate, if not end up, the dull image of politics as an area of the morally

deprived characters. In addition, PKS wants “to speak out boldly in defence of moderate Islam – an Islam that upholds the sanctity of human life, reaches out to the oppressed, respects men and women alike, and insists on the fellowship of all humankind.”⁶³ It should be emphasized that such political platforms are not without precedence. They try to draw lessons from – to borrow an Olivier Roy term – the “failure of political Islam.”⁶⁴ In this formula, there is a sense of the “politicization of Islam” through the abuse of religious symbols for the sake of certain people’s interests.⁶⁵ By this formula, PKS wishes to represent itself as an antithesis to the inability of some previous and other Islamic parties to perform genuine and “true” Islamic politics. This inability made the constituents lose their faith in the parties.

What PKS seems to display on the political stage is something different from the usual phenomenon mentioned above, as its cadres call it “Islamic politics.”⁶⁶ For some PKS cadres, “Islamic politics” differs significantly from “political Islam” in that while the latter makes the power as the end destination of politics, the first connotes politics as the field of *dakwah* (propagation) the purpose of which is serving the people and empower them by means of religious values.⁶⁷ For PKS cadres, “Islamic politics” should take precedence over “political Islam.” The politicization of Islam must be replaced by the Islamization of politics. Thus, the problem does not lie over whether or not it is allowable to bring religion into politics, but whether or not it is allowable to politicize religion. PKS wants to go beyond religious symbols and place more emphasis on the substance behind them. The party’s cadres believe that Islamic tradition provides such a role model in building this paradigm. They strongly believe that this is what the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions had done throughout his prophecy in Mecca and Medina. They also believe that the golden age of Islam under the Abbasid dynasty in the past was also inspired by this prophetic paradigm. It is this paradigm that the party’s cadres time and again want to reinforce to the public. This ideal requires a hard, serious and dedicated effort, and building a strong and convincing track record as a moral and *dakwah* party has become the priority of PKS.⁶⁸ It can be said therefore that PKS is a revised edition of the old paradigm adopted by preceding Islamic parties which might be considered as “unfaithful” to the restoration of the state and the empowerment of the weak. It has indeed been most often the case that when these parties were in power,

they utilized the symbols of religion to gain as many votes as possible while they failed to remember the fate of their constituents. It can be said that these parties took advantage of religious symbols as "*dagangan politik*" (political trade) and positioned constituents as the victims of exploitation.

PKS has benefited from its image as a morally committed party to end corruption and poverty. The party won sympathy from the grass-roots by means of its down-to-earth programs and activities. It was able to increase its vote considerably from 1.37 percent in the 1999 election to 7.34 percent in the 2004 election. It has to be acknowledged that some of its voters in the 2004 election were the floating mass, i.e., those unaligned voters who shifted their support from one party to another between 1999 and 2004. There are at least two main reasons why they gave their votes to PKS in 2004. First, they felt disillusioned by the factionalism and internal conflict of interests within the parties for which they had voted in 1999. Second, they were also disillusioned by the poor performance of the established parties which had failed to enhance the level of their prosperity. It seems that the constituents were concerned a lot about their daily problems and they were fully aware that rampant corruption and nepotism had brought about the crisis of the country. Their disillusionment with the old-established parties led to shifting their votes to another party which promised the change they were wishing for. So, giving their votes to PKS does not necessarily mean that they support the party's Islamist ideology. Rather, they were motivated by pragmatic considerations, no matter what the party's ideology might be. The people's longing for a better life could be one of the explanations why PKS's strong showing in the 2004 election.

What PKS has been attempting to do is convince the public that it is not the same sort of party as the previous Islamic parties. It is a new genre of Islamic party which represents a moral party par excellence. Theoretically, that may be plausible. In reality, however, it is indeed difficult since Indonesia's political system has been overwhelmingly occupied by corrupt practices. The main question would be: how can PKS maintain its "moral obstinacy" if the system is not conducive to this kind of attitude? This question has only two possible answers. First, PKS keeps up its idealism with the risk of being left alone by other parties. Second, PKS can loosen its moral standards in return for pragmatic causes while at the

same time remaining stringent to its cadres. This is of course one of the most dilemmatic challenges the party is facing.⁶⁹ Looking at the current situation, however, it is very likely that PKS could be trapped in a situation in which the second choice is inevitable. The party's decision to enter a coalition with other parties to nominate Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Jusuf Kalla – instead of staying neutral after the initially supported candidate pair, Amien Rais and Siswono Yudhohusodo, had been eliminated in the first round – in the second round of the 2004 presidential elections is the best case in point.⁷⁰ Many assumed that this coalition epitomized pragmatic politics par excellence as the party foresaw the likelihood of its survival amidst an SBY-Jusuf Kalla win.⁷¹ Clearly, the party could benefit from the ascendancy of this couple into power in terms of the new distribution of power.

As Vali Nasr argues, Muslim democracy would most likely emerge from the political circle, not from a scholarly circle.⁷² “Muslim Democrats,” he points out, “can begin from an Islamist point of departure, as is the case with Turkey’s AKP...”⁷³ What PKS has achieved so far seems to confirm Nasr’s theoretical assumption. The party does not have a highly sophisticated formula of what Islamic politics comprises, but it does have a set of practical guidelines taken from numerous and different sources of how Islamic politics could be executed. In doing so, PKS is to a certain extent practicing what one may call “eclectic politics,” a pragmatic attitude based on the practice of selection from any sources as long as it is considered morally – and particularly religiously – praiseworthy. Although its main reference is Al-Banna, PKS proves to be astute at using some respected Islamic scholars, either international or home-grown ones, as its reference, such as Yusuf Al-Qardhawi, Abū al-A’lā al-Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb,⁷⁴ Mohammad Natsir, Amien Rais, Nurcholish Madjid, and so forth. The party’s cadres are eager to learn from what they might consider as pristine heirs of outstanding Muslim personalities. Religiously, PKS has learned a lot from puritanical-reformist visions. Politically, it benefits a lot from modernist groups. It is a manufactured entity based on its attempts at translating the ideas and discourses of modernist and neo-modernist politics.

It seems that what lingers in the minds and hearts of PKS’s activists is the idea of “glory,” more specifically of Islam as it was in the past. The party has a road map for success to realize the idea of glory. If the party has a chance to lead the country, it

would launch the so-called "grand design of Indonesia". According to this vision the year 2014 will mark the departure point for the country's resurgence. This grand design was deliberated in its first *Munas* (Musyawarah Nasional/National Congress) held in Jakarta in July 2005. In 2019 it is hoped that Indonesia can be a leading country in the world.⁷⁵ The making of such a design was driven by a similar design made by Malaysia with its "Grand Design 2020" as a starting point of its resurgence. Tifatul Sembiring, the current chairman of PKS, maintains that the party's Grand Design was launched to overcome the current problems caused by the backwardness and inferiority complex Indonesia is facing. More particularly, the country lags far behind neighbouring countries which have only recently become developed nations, such as Malaysia and Thailand.⁷⁶

The Islamic State Reconsidered

The extent to which the idea of an Islamic state proposed by PKS is welcomed seems to show the degree of inconsistency among Indonesian Muslims. In early 2000, national opinion surveys conducted in 2001-2002 by the Centre for Study of Islam and Society at the State Islamic University in Jakarta indicate that a large majority of Indonesian Muslims supported the idea that the state should run the nation based on Islamic principles. 61 percent of respondents surveyed in 2001 and 71 percent of respondents in 2002 agreed "that the state should require all Muslim men and women to abide by the *sharī'ah*." 58 percent in 2001 and 67 percent in 2002 agreed that an Islamic government.... "under the leadership of Islamic authorities, such as ulama or kyai, is best for a country like ours."⁷⁷ Perhaps most disturbing is that 46 percent in 2001 and 54 percent in 2002 agree "that the ideals and struggle of Islamic movements or organizations (like the Islamic Defenders Front [FPI], Laskar Jihad, Darul Islam, and others) to implement the *sharī'ah* in the government and society must be supported."⁷⁸

The above findings, however, contradict the results of another survey carried out by the Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survey Indonesia, or LSI) in 2006.⁷⁹ This survey found that the majority of Muslims (82 percent) are in support of democracy and that they are (83 percent) in favour of the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution.⁸⁰ Furthermore, it is quite surprising to find that while a significant portion of the respondents (78.4 percent) agreed with the opinion that "democracy is congruent with Islam," only 8.4

percent argued that “democracy is contradictory to Islamic precepts” and 3.5 percent were of the opinion that, “The Pancasila and UUD 45 are contradictory to Islam.”⁸¹ The survey also showed decreasing support for PKS among Muslim voters with only 4.1 percent ready to choose this party if the general election was held on that day. The ups-and-downs in the support for PKS seem to indicate that the party has to struggle with the changing mood of Muslim voters and, given the LSI’s survey findings above, it is quite hard for PKS to increase its support base since it is mainly made up of Muslim voters, at least until it shows its willingness to adapt its policies to popular trends.

The extent to which opinion polls can be used as a point of reference for periodic evaluation on the party’s policies regarding the aspiration for an Islamic state or the implementation of *Sharīah* needs further investigation. This study cannot fulfil this task. It’s suffice to say that the issue of an Islamic state has widely been admitted as the main trademark of PKS. In approaching the notion of an Islamic state, although inspired by political insights of some respected figures of the Muslim Brotherhood, PKS has been undergoing a process of moderation and necessary adaptation to the Indonesian context. The cadres of the party are well aware that the issue of an Islamic state, based on the history of Islamic parties in Indonesia, is a sensitive issue that can undermine its capacity to win the minds and hearts of a larger slice of constituents. Because of this, PKS does not mention explicitly in both its manifesto and statutes that an Islamic state is on its agenda, although it does mention Islam as the basis of the state.⁸² The cadres of the party believe that Islam and the state are inseparable, but founding an Islamic state is another matter. The same thing can also be applied in relation to the application of *Sharīah* (Islamic law). The substance of Islam, for PKS, is much more important than the outer shell. That is why expounding the substance of Islam, i.e. in terms of values and norms, receives more prominence for the party than carrying the label of Islam in its political visions.

For Hidayat Nur Wahid, the preference of substance instead of the mere label has been exemplified by the practice of the Muslim polity of the past, particularly by the Prophet, the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs (*al-Khulafā al-Rāshidūn*), the Umayyad dynasty and the Abbasid dynasty.⁸³ However, Nur Wahid does not agree with the idea of secularism in a Muslim polity, since the inseparability of religion and the state is believed to be not negotiable. What

matters, in his view, is that the transformation of Islamic values in public spheres can be assured without wasting time and energy in never-ending debates about issues (*ikhtilāf*) such as the form of the state. In principle, PKS was founded "to realize a just nation-state in line with God's consent."⁸⁴ In modern terms, PKS stands for the fight for justice and the creation of a welfare state.

Nur Wahid's view is confirmed by Anis Matta, another key figure of PKS. In his view, as soon as the Prophet became the state leader of the Madinah community, the state did not automatically become an Islamic state as such. Therefore, he argues, it is simply a waste of time debating whether or not Indonesia as the biggest Muslim country in the world should be labelled an Islamic State as this will simply be irrelevant to its substance. In other words, it does not really matter whether Muslims need to explicitly proclaim the Islamic character of the state, because this country is comprised of a Muslim majority. What needs to be done is not to force the use of the label of Islam, but the transformation of the state management under Islamic values. "If our predecessors managed the country with secular principles, we in the PKS wish to manage it under Islamic principles."⁸⁵ That is why, according to Matta, PKS will never carry on the issue of an Islamic state nor *Sharī'ah* as its main agenda. Anis Matta argues further that:

What we need to do is to present Islam in public life. We are now in the process of building the *fiqh* of statehood in a broad sense, which is not textually minded. We achieve these political ways with a more substantial spirit. For instance, how to manage an educational institution under Islamic principles, how to deal with economic matters based on Islamic norms; that is what matters more. And not all of those issues can be accommodated at the level of the debate. Rather, most of them are at the level of application.⁸⁶

It is nevertheless clear that Indonesia with Islam as its basis is a long-term political goal of PKS. It is also clear that the Mawdudi-an-meliorist character will remain the nature of the party's activists, and it is this point at which PKS differs from other Qutbīan-utopian Islamists. PKS activists argue that giving concrete proof that an Islamic state will guarantee a better life for Indonesia is more critical than just debating it. Therefore, far before the label Islam is attributed to the state, i.e. "Islamic state," it is important to prove that PKS cadres are capable of managing the state professionally and that the public will feel comfortable with their ascendance to power. This is far more important than carrying the label Islam, especially if at the same time the state is bankrupt or cor-

rupt. Institutionally speaking, the label does not really matter as long as the essence of the justice and welfare state are there. Likewise, it does not really matter whether the Islamic *sharī'ah* needs to be formalized in the state structure as long as the core elements of the *sharī'ah* are well-represented in public life. This means that a strong foundation in the community must take precedence over the application of Islamic *sharī'ah*. The Islamic measures will mean nothing if they are not accompanied by a well-preparedness of the community. In the Indonesian context, according to Hidayat Nur Wahid, the issue of Islamic *sharī'ah* law has been often misunderstood. What is more crucial, in his view, is how to make the *sharī'ah* a promising solution which is beautiful to enjoy by many, something practically feasible to the real condition of Indonesia. "That is precisely what we have been struggling for," added Nur Wahid.⁸⁷

Given its Islamist vision, one should be mindful of the terms "based on Islam" or "Islamic state," since the discourse on an Islamic state and *sharī'ah* developed within PKS circles tend to show a tendency towards diversity and complexity. What an Islamic state means for the party's cadres, for instance, is not and will never be monolithic. In this context, some PKS cadres have repeatedly referred to Al-Banna's construct of an Islamic state. Al-Banna used two terms to refer to an Islamic state. The first term is *dawlah Islāmīyah*, which simply means Islamic state, and the second one is *islāh al-dawlah* (reformation of the state).⁸⁸ Both of them were used interchangeably by Al-Banna in referring to an ideal state for Muslims. The reference to these terms has different implications though; while the first term generates what Iran has declared and implemented since its revolution in 1979 (i.e. the Islamic Republic of Iran), the second term might result in what happens in most Muslim majority countries like Indonesia nowadays. The urgent need to reform the state is motivated by economic and political crises as well as moral decay in some Muslim countries. Overall, it seems that PKS activists are motivated primarily by the second option in upholding *sharī'ah*-based law enforcement. They argue that the crisis needs to be overcome by Islamic formulas as reflected in the *sharī'ah*, and thus it is not necessarily urgent to establish an Islamic state like in the case of Iran. It is *islāh al-dawlah* that Anis Matta believes to fit in with the current condition of Indonesia. He puts more emphasis on the management of the state based on Islamic values than on the formalization of *sharī'ah*. The

reformation of the state needs to be done step by step, from the smallest level such as the individual and family to the biggest one, the surrounding community and the state.⁸⁹

As has been mentioned earlier, PKS is concerned with establishing an Islamic state according to a Mawdudian-meliorist interpretation. This approach allows the party to incorporate some Islamic elements into the public sphere. In this perspective, it can be said that the idea of an Islamic state in the minds of PKS cadres is not only the continuum, but also the advancement, of what some modernist activists such as Zaenal Abidin Ahmad and Mohammad Natsir had proposed following the constitutional debate in the 1950s.⁹⁰ These thinkers were proponents of the holistic view of the relationship between Islam and the state and were, thus, against the type of secularism proposed by some of the secular nationalists such as Soekarno, Hatta, Supomo, and others who argued that Islam should be permeated as the spirit of politics as manifested in "*politik garam*" [the politics of salt], and not "*politik gincu*" [the politics of lipstick]. Whilst the first refers to how the substance of Islam, and not the symbol, is presented in the world of politics as values, the latter, "*politik gincu*", means the opposite: symbols do matter, more than substance. Interestingly, today PKS activists seem to support the argument "*politik garam*", proposed by the 1950s secular nationalists who argued that Islamic values should be colouring all activities and policies of the state as a whole. What remains Mawdudian-meliorist is that the area of politics should be given a sense of sacredness; life should be treated as a field of the observation to God. Nevertheless, the idea of an Islamic state is not a matter of formalism; it is a matter of substance.⁹¹

It is worth noting that one of the important key words to understand the political goals of PKS is "evolution." In its attempts to implement Islamic values and *sharīah*, PKS considers the existing condition of the community and the state as an important factor.⁹² It will never advocate the application of Islam in the state structure as long as there is no well-established precondition for that. Hidayat Nur Wahid, for instance, by citing Hartono Mardjono's⁹³ statement, argues that 95 percent of the elements of Islamic law can be applied at the present time. The remaining five percent, comprising some aspects of *sharīah* such as *hudūd* (boundaries) and other types of punishment in Islamic law, is considered insignificant to achieve unless the 95 percent element is upheld consistently in public life.⁹⁴ The application of Islamic law must

consider the readiness of the society. The word evolution indicates that PKS will apply Islamic law gradually based on the capacity of the Muslim community to accept it. This implies that there are two other key terms: the minimal *sharī'ah* and the maximal *sharī'ah*. The application of *sharī'ah* must gradually move from the minimal *sharī'ah* to the maximal or 100 percent *sharī'ah*, even though what the latter stands for in detail is still vague.

Mutammimul Ula, another PKS activist who is now a member of parliament, argues that national law can utilize Islamic law as its main inspiration while *adat* law can give a sense of locality and Western law can function as a complement, especially with regards to the adoption of science and technology on a practical level.⁹⁵ He bases himself on three arguments: First, philosophically, Islamic law contains in itself the spirit of justice. In addition to being a value system, Islam, he believes, is a methodology (*minhāj*) of how to achieve it. Unlike other nations which might have the same value system as Islam such as justice, harmony, discipline and peace, they do not have the same methodology as Islam has to achieve it. What is meant by the methodology is a sub-value system which underpins the value system.⁹⁶ Second, he also claims that Islamic law is the most detailed judicial system compared to other systems in the world. Third, sociologically, the majority of Indonesian society chooses Islam as their religion. Islamic law, in his opinion, has for a long time been a living law in the heart of the society.⁹⁷

In order for the efforts to apply Islamic law to be successful, it is important for PKS to disseminate and propagate Islam to the society. In doing *dakwah*, the party's cadres tend to avoid or withdraw themselves from issues which can stimulate public debate over religious matters (*khilāfīyah*). They gained a high profile for their quick response to human disasters in several areas in Indonesia. They were, for example, first on the spot at the location of disasters such as the 2004 tsunami disaster in Aceh and North Sumatra, when they sent an expedition called "Operasi Uhud" – a word taken from a war waged by the Prophet Muhammad, the Battle of Uhud.⁹⁸ With activities like these they ensure that the party can maintain its profile as a workers' party. Given this strategy, they believe that there is no *khilāfīyah* in God's law.

It remains unclear, however, whether PKS would some day endorse the application of cutting hands for theft in criminal law, even though this punishment is spelled out explicitly in the Qur'an. What seems to be clear is that PKS does not want to force itself to

be involved in a public debate over whether or not this type of punishment can be applied in the context of Indonesia. Doing so could undermine the positive image of the party. It should also be acknowledged that within PKS there are basically two mainstreams: the camp that agrees with the application of Islamic law in its very literal sense, and those who advocate the substantiation of Islamic law. It seems that the idea of the compatibility between Islam and democracy is propagated by the second camp.

It is therefore very important to note that the issue of *sharīah* implementation is a hotly contested concept within PKS. A careful analysis of the viewpoints proposed by some of the party's top cadres and activists seems to confirm the diverse propensity of what the *sharīah* means and how it should be implemented at a practical level.⁹⁹ This is a direct implication of the rich and heterogeneous nature of Islamic legal schools in Islam, even though the majority of Indonesian Muslims embrace the Shafi'ite legal school. As a consequence, it is no wonder that the meaning and scope of *sharīah* is very broad. What is monolithic is the fact that all PKS cadres advise that Islamic law be applied in all aspects of life, from the individual level to state level. However, they disagree with one another in what forms and ways the *sharīah* should be applied. Due to this reason, the leadership of the party – not only in the *Tanfidhiyah* (executive body) but also in the *Majlis Suro* – is a very crucial factor in determining to which direction the issue is likely to go.¹⁰⁰ If the party's rank and file do understand the complexity of Islamic law implementation, then they might be more prudential in the dissemination of information and in advocating the issue. Hidayat Nur Wahid can be included in this group of leaders. Under Nur Wahid's leadership, PKS tended to perform more on pragmatic issues – as repeatedly mentioned above – rather than the *Sharīah* issue. He realized that putting more emphasis on the latter issue would be counter-productive for the purpose of widening its constituency.

The Legacy of Masyumi

Most PKS activists and cadres are relatively well-educated with secular campuses as their centre of activity.¹⁰¹ Even though most of them are not deeply learned in Islamic knowledge, they are fully committed to searching for and implementing what they believe to be authentic Islam, a version of religion that is presumably inherited from the pious predecessors. It can be said

that the existence of PKS is a continuum of previous Islamic political parties such as Masyumi.¹⁰² Nonetheless, PKS is not a replica of Masyumi; rather, it is a revised version of Masyumi, a then-Mohammad Natsir-led political party, himself as the colleague and adorer of Abū al-A'lā al-Mawdudi.¹⁰³ On the basis of the spirit of learning from the past, PKS activists want to improve the performance of Masyumi by, among others, swaying the pendulum of politics into a more compromised way to the centre of power. This attitude was proven by its willingness to form a coalition with other political parties or the ruling government, regardless of prevailing differences in ideology.

Viewed from a historical perspective, Masyumi was an Islamic party that was generally antagonistic towards the strongest party of the time, the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia/Indonesian Nationalist Party).¹⁰⁴ Despite its Islamic orientation, Masyumi was, especially in the 1950s, one of the few Indonesian parties that adhered to Western ideas of democracy. Today, Natsir can be seen as one of the most influential figures in the formation of PKS' Islamism. Many of the founders of PK[S] were disciples of Natsir and Buya Malik Ahmad, another influential figure of Masyumi.¹⁰⁵ To these activists, the figure of Natsir represents an enduring legacy to the making of the intellectual character of PKS. Natsir, through his Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia [DDII], has made considerable attempts to translate the thoughts and ideas of Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, which are now readily accessible to PKS cadres and activists in secular campuses.¹⁰⁶

Basically, PKS activists are the reincarnation of Masyumi, at least at a symbolic level.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, unlike the older generation of Masyumi, the better political environment of today in which PKS activists live marks different viewpoints to that of Masyumi. As is well-known, Masyumi activists had to put up with political repression and marginalization by the government. Conversely, PKS activists can exercise their political activities freely. In fact, they are part of the government today. The political activism of PKS began when the New Order government shut down campus activism in the early 1980s. Many Muslim students tried to adopt the Muslim brotherhood's methods of spreading Islamic moral values by using cells (*usroh*) led by a trainer (*murabbi*). When the New Order regime collapsed, they started to rethink their strategy and began to make their activism accessible to a wider audience by establishing Partai Keadilan (PK). To a certain degree, the in-

clusion of PKS activists into the prevailing political system can be seen as a form of political participation from educated Muslims previously marginalized by the New Order. The phenomenon of PKS, thus, represents a process of social mobilization among young educated Muslims into the public sphere, rather than merely a continuation of an ideological struggle.

Although PKS leaders readily pay homage to the role of DDII and former Masyumi leaders, it does not mean that they are not critical of some religious standpoints propagated by the latter. Some of them even question the relevance of the Masyumi legacy for modern-day Indonesia by arguing that the approaches of Masyumi and DDII are outdated. Mutammimul 'Ula, for instance, argues that the Masyumi legacy is no longer feasible in a present-day context because of the irreversible change of history and political models.¹⁰⁸ Fachry Hamzah, another PKS leader, argues in a similar tone that PKS is not Masyumi in its thinking. He even goes a step further, belittling PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang/Moon and Crescent Party) as "Masyumi nostalgia."¹⁰⁹ Many in PKS feel that the DDII's heavy emphasis on matters pertaining to "external threats" to the Islamic community such as Christian campaigns to convert Muslims and American-Jewish conspiracy theories to undermine Islam and the Muslim *ummah* should not be regarded as important priorities in PKS' political struggle. While such views would be shared by many in PKS, they are not prominent in the party's discourses in general. PKS activists prefer to place greater emphasis upon the development of the personal piety of Muslims and are more responsive to issues such as inter-religious respect than their counterparts in DDII.¹¹⁰

Between the Madinah Charter and Jakarta Charter

The PKS' subscription to the Madinah Charter (*Mīthāq al-Madīnah*), instead of the Jakarta Charter, has been one of the most important but controversial breakthroughs in the development of Islamic political ideas in Indonesia.¹¹¹ It was an important departure because most Islamist groups favour the inculcation of the legendary seven words of the Jakarta Charter ("with the obligation of the Muslims to practice the Islamic *sharī'ah*") into the preamble of the 1945 constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar [UUD] 1945). It was controversial because its counterparts accused the party of having betrayed the struggle for the implementation of the *sharī'ah*. In response to that, Some PKS leaders asserted time

and time again that the party's formal policy against the Jakarta Charter reflected the party's commitment to pluralism. As far as its formal manifesto was concerned, the party did not have any intention of establishing an "Islamic state" in a conventional sense. In Hidayat Nur Wahid's opinion, the Madinah Charter has been the inspiration based upon which a modern "*masyarakat madani*" (civil society order) was going to be established.¹¹² Under the Charter, he argued, all elements of the Madinah society proved to be able to coexist peacefully. He went on to argue that the Prophet has never labelled what he achieved in Madinah as an "Islamic state."¹¹³ Nevertheless, the Prophet did establish the foundations of a modern nation-state, which was even considered too modern for his era.¹¹⁴ It is no wonder that three out of four of the Guided Caliphs were later on assassinated for their failure to bring about a peaceful social transformation into a modern society.

To a certain extent, the PKS's subscription to the Madinah Charter could be criticized, due in part to the fact that it is not spelled out explicitly in its statutes. One may argue that the Charter has been omitted for tactical reasons as there is basically no point of mentioning it specifically if it can be used whenever necessary without actually spelling it out in the statutes. The party's cadres seem to be aware that an inclusion of the Madinah Charter in the party constitution could put the party at risk of losing support from those who aspire to the Jakarta Charter. At the same time it is also noteworthy that the current party statutes feature words like Pancasila that were not spelled out initially when the party was still called PK. This refusal to commit to Islamist terms may be regarded as a tactical gamble, but it can also be seen as a sign of the party's appreciation of pluralism in a broader sense.

Viewed from its statutes, vision and mission, it seems that PKS wishes to integrate religious values and Indonesian cultural beliefs into a single coherent national identity. As explained above, its political vision has been inspired mainly by the integrative-holistic school of political thought of such thinkers as Abū al-A'la al-Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al-Banna, Yusuf al-Qardhawi, and Mohammad Natsir.¹¹⁵ According to these Muslim scholars, Islam is a holistic religion dealing not only with worldly matters, but also with the life of here-after; Islam is a religion [*din*] and a state [*dawlah*] altogether, although the various thinkers differ over how this paradigm should be implemented. This paradigm may influence – either directly or indirectly – the party's political world-

views, i.e., how PKS approaches politics from the perspective of this holistic paradigm. Its general vision, for example, says that PKS serves "as a *dakwah* party to uphold justice and prosperity in the framework of Muslim unity and state."¹¹⁶ By and large, they are morally self-sufficient in terms of religious values and are prepared to transform the surrounding society in accordance with these values. In its mission, for example, it is clear that the word *taghyīr* (change, transformation) has a particular emphasis in the course of social encounters and interaction with the society. Its basic principle is that they are ready to get involved in social interactions but they will not lose everything. This is in line with the legendary motto borrowed from Sayyid Qutb: "*nakhtalitūn walakin natamayyazūn*".¹¹⁷

In response to pluralism, it seems that PKS is more attracted to the idea of a "melting pot,"¹¹⁸ rather than a "salad bowl,"¹¹⁹ society. While in the latter type of society it is assumed that the social interaction can result in an acculturation, where Islamic values are ready to integrate with a new and different genre of cultural identity, the former refers to the condition where social interactions will only result in the confirmation of Islamic values over the others. If the latter can risk losing some elements of what they believe as Islamic, the first only adheres to the paradigm of monoculture, that is, Islamic culture. It is more often the case that the Islamic values are expected to win the process of the "cultural battle" because Islamists do not want to lose anything. The party's cadres usually have a tacit knowledge that they are practicing an "Islamic personality" par excellence, which is assumed to be superior to other personalities. As a case in point, there is hardly any PKS cadre who will be found smoking. In a country where smoking is almost second nature, this is a remarkable phenomenon. For committed PKS members, smoking is not only bad for personal health, but also theologically illicit in Islam.¹²⁰

Despite the fact that the PKS statute clearly states that the party is based on Islam, Pancasila is mentioned under Chapter 2 [Purpose and Effort] and article 5 [Purpose] which says: "Partai Keadilan Sejahtera is a *Dakwah* Party whose purpose is to realize a just and prosperous society under the consent of Allah within the framework of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia which is based on Pancasila."¹²¹ It is clear that there is a sense of compromise, even ambiguity, between the party's foundation of Islam on the one hand, and the widely-accepted platform of Pancasila, on

the other. Nonetheless, Tifatul Sembiring, the current chairman of the party, argues that the era of dominance of Pancasila as the sole philosophical foundation for political parties is over, as it was a part of Soeharto's New Order, which was brought down in the late 1990s. However, he points out that the formula of Pancasila is not clear enough.¹²² That is why PKS wants to break the idea of pluralism down into a more concrete concept by referring to the spirit of the Madinah Charter. If the party is given a chance to lead the country, he says, it will make all elements of society prosper without exception. All citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, are equal before the law. This is inspired by the Prophet's saying "whoever oppresses non-Muslims without any due reason, he/she will be my enemy in the hereafter."¹²³ As a party which claims to be faithful to democracy, PKS wishes to give the same chance to everybody, Muslims and non-Muslims alike.¹²⁴

That the attitude of PKS towards democracy is somewhat ambiguous became visible for the first time in the year 2000 when the party's MPR fraction, which at that time was aligned to Amien Rais's PAN in the so-called *Fraksi Reformasi* (Reformation Fraction), voted against the amendment of Article 29 of the constitution.¹²⁵ The amendment was proposed by several Islamic parties including PBB and PPP, who aspired to the formalization of *Sharī'ah* through the incorporation of the Jakarta Charter.¹²⁶ As PKS rejected the Jakarta Charter, the party was accused by the other Islamic parties of having betrayed its commitment to the implementation of the *Sharī'ah*. In response, PKS raised the issue of the Madinah Charter as its political platform.¹²⁷ Basically, the Charter contains, among others, a declaration that the whole Madinah community, regardless of the religious beliefs of its individual members, was regarded as a single community (*ummah wahidah*). Therefore, each member of the community was obliged to help, protect and respect the other and was given freedom to observe his/her religion. Despite the pluralist appearance of the Charter, however, some critics have accused PKS of employed it as a tactical means of "rear-door politics."¹²⁸ They assume that Nur Wahid hides behind the universal values of the Charter to mask PKS's genuine ambition to establish an "Islamic state."

This accusation, however, has been rebutted by Untung Wahono, one of the party's leading cadres.¹²⁹ In his column published by the leading Indonesian daily *Kompas* Wahono asserted that such an accusation is academically and empirically unfounded. The ac-

cusation itself was appreciated in terms of freedom of expression, but according to Wahono, Burhani – the author of the critique – used some inaccurate data to justify his assumption. The first aspect Wahono expounded was regarding the Jakarta Charter when he said that during the debate there emerged three positions towards the issue of amending Article 29 of the UUD 1945. The first was represented by those who wanted the article not to be amended. The second position was held by those who aspired to the inculcation of the Jakarta Charter into the article with the additional phrase: “The Oneness of God with the Obligation of every Muslim to practice *Sharīah*.” The third was formulated by those who aspired to amending the article with the additional phrase “The Oneness of God with the obligation of every citizen to observe his/her own religion.” The second group included the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/United Development Party) and PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang/The Crescent Moon and Star Party). It was simply not true - according to Wahono - that PKS was in the same boat with these two Islamic parties, pioneering the implementation of the Jakarta Charter during the debate in the MPR. He maintained that the policy of PKS had been achieved through a long process of internal debate and deliberation. The result was that PK, as the party was still called at that time, was a proponent of the third position, together with PAN.¹³⁰

There were three arguments as to why PKS proposed the Madinah Charter, instead of the Jakarta Charter, to be the main inspiration of any amendment. First, it was to uphold the religious values espoused by the Preamble of the UUD 1945. Second, it was to emphasize the equal position of religions in Indonesia. In a *bayanat* (explanation) leaflet disseminated by the party at that time, PKS illustrated how the impact of the Torah and the Bible for the Jews and Christians respectively.¹³¹ By proposing the additional phrase “with the obligation of every citizen to observe his/her own religion,” PKS felt that the spiritual life is properly appreciated in a religious country such as Indonesia. It was also obvious that PKS had never proposed the Jakarta Charter during the process of amendment of the UUD 1945, argued Wahono.¹³²

The reference made by PKS to the Madinah Charter should, in Wahono’s view, be respected not only as a proportional process, but also as a democratic choice which is guaranteed by the constitution. “Democratization of reference,” as Wahono called it, had been a product of the reformation process in Indonesia since 1998

which was signified by the nullification of the Pancasila-minded dogma as the sole foundation of the country. The old tradition of politics exemplified by a totally uniform and naive attitude towards different ideas and struggles to achieve interests, in his view, was out-dated. Therefore, the accusation that PKS has been practicing a “rear-door strategy” was historically, politically and ethically baseless. As Wahono has argued convincingly, PKS is ready to take part in the democratization process on the normal political stage, where it interacts with any kind of societal element, in any form.¹³³

Concluding Remarks

What can be drawn from the above explanation is the very fact that PKS is one of the very few Islamic parties which seek to craft their own tradition of democracy based on day-to-day politics and down-to-earth policies and programs. The party’s leaders and members incessantly attempt to convince the public that Islamism is not necessarily akin to what many describe as radical Islam which is at all times hostile towards real politics and democracy. As a variant of the Mawdudian-meliorist approach, what they are trying to exhibit is something that seems to be peculiar to the minds of many: pietism or salafism on the one hand, coupled with political pragmatism on the other. While this is nothing new in discourses of sociology, its existence in Indonesia deserves extra appreciation as it gives rise to a “new brand” of Islamic politics. PKS seeks to challenge the mainstream worldview – especially held by the Qutbian-utopian Islamists – that politics is a dirty area and, as a result, would be the grave for religious values. What needs to be done is, in their holistic Mawdudian-meliorist conception, the creation of a sense of the sacred to the territory of politics. They also wish to argue against the Qutbian-utopian Islamists’ belief that Islam is, by definition, incompatible with democracy. They believe that there is no reason to contradict the idea of Islam to democracy, because Islam is in itself democratic. Hence, there is no reason to separate religion from politics.¹³⁴

Viewed from its vision, PKS represents a new juncture, a sort of meeting angle of different outlooks. It serves as a bridging ground between Islamic social organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU, whose commitment to democratic values is unquestionable, and other more extreme Islamists such as HTI and MMI who firmly reject democracy. Eclectic politics is an inevitable choice

within such a context. The predication of PKS upon the Mawdudi-an-meliorist approach does not compel it to pledge its allegiance solely to Mawdudi's political and religious outlooks. Rather, the party seeks to perform an open-minded mode in a way that an intellectual dialogue with other elements of society is necessary to make Indonesia more modernized. In this context, the party adopts many intellectual viewpoints from different sources as long as they help enhance the soft power of the party. Therefore, it is not surprising that its Mawdudian-meliorist mode is coupled with other elements from Sayyid Qutb, Yusuf Qardhawi, Hasan Al-Banna, as well as some nationally respected figures such as Mohammad Natsir of Masyumi/DDII, Nurcholish Madjid and Amien Rais, to name but a few.¹³⁵ What is certain is the fact that those figures, except Qutb, are all proponents of the compatibility between Islam and democracy. It seems clear that within the party lies a spirit of reinvigoration of the old paradigm with the new one, representing a bridge between the traditional view on Islamic politics and the revised modern one. Just like many other religion-based organizations, PKS is enmeshed in a never-ending rumble in which the process of finding its own identity is at stake. Theologically speaking, the worldviews of PKS are drawn mainly from the teachings of salafism such as keeping the purity of faith and moral values such as sincerity and the like. Politically speaking, it is obsessed with the idea of self-glorification as it emerged in the Golden Age of Islam. They mostly believe that Islam will assume power, and due to this reason, they are preoccupied with the idea that they must be the leader of the world civilization, rather than a follower.

PKS comprises those activists who opt to the parliamentary way of struggle rather than the extra-parliamentary, especially on the grounds that the struggle from within could be more feasible than an external one. One of the most basic underlying assumptions is that any transformation process needs a power structure in order to be successful. Interestingly, however, PKS might follow what Shakespeare has uttered: "what's in a name," in that Islamic politics should not necessarily carry an Islamic label. This could be a tactical choice in order to increase its secular support base. In doing so, the party employs a double-standard strategy. Inwardly speaking, it imposes stringent Islamic moral standards on its cadres and activists, whereas to its external environment it deploys a religiously neutral and down-to-earth language with a focus on

anti-corruption and good governance, war against poverty and injustice, simple life style and self-discipline, and pluralism.

Amidst the configuration of Islamic political parties in Indonesia, the party seems to occupy an in-between position. On the one hand, it represents the "moral stubbornness" of an Islamist movement whose aspiration is to make God's values available to the public sphere. On the other hand, the party is entrenched with an attachment to the modern aspects of life. As a result, democracy is inevitable as a way to signify that the party is modern by nature, just as Islam is believed to be as well. To be a true Muslim does not necessarily mean to leave democracy or vice versa. Put differently, one can be a Muslim and a democrat at the same time.¹³⁶ Whether this promising rhetoric can be proven right, however, remains uncertain. While stressing its democratic credentials on the surface, it remains uncertain whether the party will really be able to produce a genuine identity for Islamic democracy. Doubts remain whether the party can accept democracy in a liberal sense as long as its cadres and activists argue that they are crafting a so-called "Islamic democracy," and not liberal democracy. As some observers have pointed out, PKS's acceptance of democracy is considered as merely a strategy to win votes.¹³⁷ By the time they are in power, they will harness democracy as a mechanism to impose undemocratic elements of religion into society.

Endnotes

1. The support for the establishment of an Islamic state appears to have declined significantly since 1955, as can be seen in the waning support for Islamic parties aspiring for the establishment of an Islamic state through general elections. As an illustration, the support for all Islamic parties (Masyumi, NU, PSII, and PERTI) during the 1955 general election reached 43.5% of the total vote. This number declined significantly in the general elections during the New Order regime. In the 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987 and 1992 general elections, for instance, the accumulation of the support for all Islamic parties – from 1977 onwards merged into one party, the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*) – was only 27%, 29.3%, 27.2%, 16.0%, and 17.1% respectively. For further information on the 1955 general election see, among others, Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asian Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1957), especially pages 58-9. For information on general elections during the New Order regime, see, R. William Liddle, *Pemilu-pemilu Orde Baru: Pasang Surut Kekuasaan Politik* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1992); Hans Antlöv and Sven Cederroth (Eds.), *Elections in Indonesia: the New Order and Beyond* (London: Routledge, 2004).
2. See, among others, Zachary Abuza, "Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24, No. 3, Dec. 2002: 427-465.
3. Erich Kolig, "Radical Islam, Islamic Fervour, and Political Sentiments in Central Java, Indonesia," *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 4, No. 1, 2005: 57.
4. Masdar Hilmy, "Looking into God's Heaven: Theological Constructs of Islamic Radicalism in Post New Order Indonesia," *Asian Cultural Studies* 15, 2006: 11-23.
5. Greg Fealy, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?," *Southeast Asian Affairs 2004* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004) 104-121.
6. *Ibid.*, 105.
7. For a more detailed analysis of Mawdudi's political ideas see, for instance, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Cf. Charles J. Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State," in John L. Esposito (ed.), *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) 99-133.
8. I am referring to the conceptual framework by Daniel Sommer Robinson in his article, "A Critique of Meliorism," *International Journal of Ethics* 34, No. 2, Jan. 1924: 175-194.
9. Edward L. Schaub, "Spirit Militant and Spirit Harmonious," *The Philosophical Review* 32, No. 2, Mar. 1923: 177.
10. *Ibid.*, 162.
11. See the official PKS website at: <http://www.pk-sejahtera.org>.
12. *Ibid.*
13. As for the transformation of Muslim student movements in secular campuses into PK/PKS, see, among others, Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia*; Cf. Yon Machmudi, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Wajah Baru Islam Politik Indonesia* (Bandung: Harkatuna Publishing, 2005).
14. See, "Jajak Pendapat 'Kompas': PKS, Menuai Buah Konsistensi," *Kompas*, 25 June 2005.
15. Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (DPP) PKS, *Menyelamatkan Bangsa: Platform Kebijakan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Jakarta: Al-I'tisom Cahaya Ummat, 2004) ix.
16. DPP Partai Keadilan, *Sekilas Partai Keadilan* (Jakarta: DPP Partai Keadilan, 1998) 27-39. These characteristics have been explained by Damanik. See: Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, 239-56.
17. See: <http://www.pk-sejahtera.org>.

18. Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, 258-60.
19. DPP PKS, *Menyeleamatkan Bangsa*, 17-32.
20. *Ibid.*, 339.
21. Regarding the fall of Soeharto, see, among others, Geoff Forrester and R.J. May (eds.), *The Fall of Soeharto* (Singapore: Select Books, 1999); Donald K. Emmerson, "Exit and Aftermath: The Crisis of 1997-8," *Indonesia Beyond Soeharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition*, ed. Donald K. Emmerson (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); Damien Kingsbury and Arief Budiman (eds.), *Indonesia: the Uncertain Transition* (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2001).
22. Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia*, Lowy Institute Paper 05 (New South Wales: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005) 70.
23. *Ibid.*
24. See, for instance, Devi Asmarani, "PKS Wins by Downplaying Islamic Agenda," *The Jakarta Post*, 12 April 2004.
25. Azyumardi Azra, "Indonesian Islam, Election Politics and Beyond," *Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS)*, 4 Nov. 2004: 12-14.
26. Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Joining the Caravan*, 71.
27. Around 5,800 questionnaires were returned back with the result that the majority of respondents (+68 percent) aspired to the founding of an Islamic party, while 27 percent of them wished to found a social organization, and the rest felt that they should remain where they were. On the basis of this poll, they proceeded to invite a range of prominent figures in the *dakwah* movement to discuss the establishment of a political party. In July 1998, the decision to form Partai Keadilan (PK) was announced by 52 *dakwah* leaders. Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, 228-30; cf. Aay Muhammad Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2004) 151.
28. Dini Djalal, "Indonesia's Powerful Student Movement Divided," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (March 22, 2001), as cited by Elizabeth Fuller Collins, "Islam is the Solution: Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia," 17 (<http://www.classics.ohiou.edu/faculty/collins/islamsolution.pdf>).
29. Elizabeth Fuller Collins and Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, "Islam and Democracy! The Successful New Party PKS is a Moderate Alternative to Radical Islamism," *Inside Indonesia* (Jan-Mar 2005) 21-22.
30. Hidayat Nur Wahid, public lecture and interview, Melbourne, June 2005.
31. Elizabeth Fuller-Collins, "Islam is the Solution," 17-18.
32. The party's statute can be accessed at: http://www.pk-sejahtera.de/download/ad_pks.pdf.
33. DPP Partai Keadilan, *Sekilas Partai Keadilan* (Jakarta: DPP Partai Keadilan, 1998) 34-5; cf. Mathias Diederich, "A Closer Look at Dakwah and Politics in Indonesia: The Partai Keadilan, Some Insights into its History and an Analysis of its Programs and Statutes," *Archipel*, 64, 2002: 101-15, especially pages 108-09.
34. Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, 251.
35. Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan*, 73; cf. Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, "Between the Global and the Local: Islamism, the Middle East, and Indonesia," *Analysis Paper No. 9*, Washington: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution (October 2005).
36. *Ibid.*, 32.
37. William Liddle, "'Demokrasi Indonesia Sangat Berhasil," interview with Hamid Basyaib of Jaringan Islam Liberal (Network of Liberal Islam), 5 April 2004 (<http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=544>), accessed on 7 August 2005.
38. "Terjadi Bagi-bagi Uang di DPRD Sumsel", *Media Indonesia Online*, 8 May 2003.
39. See, "Partai Islam dan Hasil Pemilu 2004", *Sabili* No 23 year XI (4 June 2004): 109-11.

40. This claim was made by Hilmi Aminuddin, the Chairman of PKS's Consultative Assembly (Majlis Shura), as cited by *Tempo*, "Partai Dakwah di Simpang Jalan," 23/XXXIV/01 (7 August 2005).
41. Martin van Bruinessen, "Post-Soeharto Muslim engagements with civil society and democracy," paper presented at the Third International Conference and Workshop "Indonesia in Transition," organized by the KNAW and Labosio, Universitas Indonesia, August 24-28, 2003. Its online version is also available at: http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/Post_Soeharto_Islam_and_civil_society.
42. *Ibid.*, 16.
43. *Ibid.*, especially pages 17 and 19.
44. Compare this with Liddle's opinion which considers the party's double standard strategy as one of its strengths. A similar opinion has also been expounded by Lili Romli who says that PKS's success was inseparable from its dual political platform it had presented, that is, Islamism and good governance. See Liddle, "Demokrasi Indonesia Sangat Berhasil"; Cf. Lili Romli, "Partai Islam dan Memilih Islam di Indonesia," *Jurnal Penelitian Politik*, vol. 1, no. 1, LIPI Press, Jakarta, 2004: 29-48.
45. Bubalo and Fealy, "Between the Global and the Local," 31.
46. This issue was reported by daily paper *Republika* under the title "Mengkaji Kasus Suropto" (November 28, 2002); "Hegemoni AS dan Skenario Antiterorisme" (December 19, 2002).
47. See, DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, *Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula* (Jakarta: DPP PK Sejahtera in Collaboration with PT Syamil Cipta Media, 2004).
48. *Ibid.* 155-61.
49. "Kalla Mengakui bahwa Indonesia Kecolongan: Peledakan Diduga Karena Persaingan Industri Pariwisata," *Kompas*, 24 October 2005.
50. This information was given by a reliable source who witnessed the raid but did not wish to be identified.
51. "Kecupan Terakhir Menjelang Syahid", *Sabili*, No. 22/Year XI (21 May 2004): 100-01.
52. Elizabeth Fuller Collins and Ihsan Ali Fauzi, "Islam and Democracy!."
53. Hidayat Nur Wahid, "Kedepankan Moral dan Dakwah," *Ensiklopedi Tokoh Indonesia* (<http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/h/hidayat-nur-wahid/index.shtml>), accessed on 3 January 2006.
54. Bruinessen, "Post-Soeharto Muslim engagements with civil society and democracy," 17-18.
55. Compare this viewpoint with that of Nurcholish Madjid who predicted that it would not be too surprising if one day PKS became one of the important political parties in Indonesian politics. See Nurcholish Madjid, "Partai Keadilan Nanti Muncul Sebagai Partai Penting", *Tujuh Mesin Pendulang Suara*, eds. Hairus Salim, et. al. (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999) 193-94.
56. Bruinessen, "Post-Soeharto Muslim engagements with civil society and democracy," 18.
57. See, the party's statute at http://www.pk-sejahtera.de/download/ad_pks.pdf.
58. Sadanand Dhume, "Indonesian Democracy's Enemy Within," *The Asian Age*, <http://www.asianage.com/main.asp?layout=2&cat1=1&cat2=153&newsid=196060&RF=Defau\1tMain>, accessed on 25 January 2006; Cf. his other column, "Indonesia: Democracy Wins, but Danger Remains," *The Asian Age* (10/23/2004): <http://www.asianage.com/printarticle2.asp?newsid=66098>, accessed on 25 January 2006.
59. Sadanand Dhume, "Radical March on Indonesia's Future," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 168, 5, May 2005: 12.
60. *Ibid.*, 15.
61. *Ibid.*, 19.

62. Hidayat Nur Wahid and Zulkieflimansyah, "The Justice Party and Democracy: A Journey of a Thousand Miles Starts with a Single Step," *Piety and Pragmatism: Trends in Indonesian Islamic Politics*, ed. Amy McCreedy, Special Report (Woodrow Wilson Center, Asia Program, April 2003) 20-2 (http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/asiarpt_110.pdf).
63. *Ibid.*, 20.
64. Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
65. Bassam Tibi, *Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and The New World Disorder* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
66. Interview with two anonymous PKS cadres who are undertaking their PhD at the University of Melbourne and Monash University respectively, 9 November 2005.
67. Hidayat Nur Wahid, "Kedepankan Moral dan Dakwah," *Ensiklopedi Tokoh Indonesia* (<http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/h/hidayat-nur-wahid/index.shtml>), accessed on 3 January 2006.
68. DPP Partai Keadilan, *Kebijakan Dasar Partai Keadilan 2000-2005* (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiyatuna, 2002) 18.
69. Aay Muhammad Furkon, "Partai Dakwah dalam Dilema," *Sabili*, No. 26/year XI (16 July 2004): 32-33.
70. See for instance, Untung Wahono, "Koalisi Kikuk", *Sabili*, No. 4/year XII (10 September 2004): 32-33.
71. Andrew Steele, "The Decline of Political Islam in Indonesia," *Asia Times*, 28 March 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HC28Ae03.html, accessed: 23 April 2006.
72. Vali Nasr, "The Rise of 'Muslim Democracy,'" *Journal of Democracy* 16, No. 2, Apr. 2005: 13-27.
73. *Ibid.*, 15.
74. Bubalo and Fealy argue that PKS has drawn a great deal of its ideology from that of Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, they argue that the party has adjusted some of its ideas to the local context of Indonesia. This is, I would assume, inseparable from the basic characteristic of PKS which practices eclectic politics. For further accounts on this, see Bubalo and Fealy, "Between the Global and the Local..." 26-32.
75. Hidayat Nur Wahid, "PKS Solusi Permasalahan Bangsa (1)," *Ensiklopedi Tokoh Indonesia* (<http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/h/hidayat-nur-wahid/wawancara.shtml>), accessed on 3 January 2006.
76. Tifatul Sembiring, "Grand Design Indonesia Versi PKS," *Ensiklopedi Tokoh Indonesia* (<http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/t/tifatul-sembring/berita/index.shtml>), accessed on 3 January 2006.
77. R. William Liddle, "New Patterns of Islamic Politics in Democratic Indonesia," in Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Asia Program Special Report (Piety and Pragmatism: Trends in Indonesian Islamic Politics) 110 (April 2003): see: http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/asiarpt_110.pdf, 4-13. See also, Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, "Politics, Islam, and Public Opinion," *Journal of Democracy* 15, Jan. 2004: 109-23.
78. *Ibid.*
79. The opinion survey was undertaken in all provinces of Indonesia throughout the period 23 September-3 October 2006 with 1092 Muslim respondents.
80. Lembaga Survey Indonesia (LSI), *Prospek Islam Politik*, Unpublished Research Report, Jakarta, October 2006 (<http://www.lsi.or.id>), accessed: 12 February 2006.
81. *Ibid.*
82. Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, 235-36.
83. *Ibid.*, 236.
84. *Ibid.*
85. *Ibid.*, 235.

86. Ibid.
87. Interview with Hidayat Nur Wahid, "PKS Solusi Permasalahan Bangsa," *Ensiklopedi Tokoh Indonesia*: <http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/h/hidayat-nur-wahid/wawancara.shtml>, accessed on 3 January 2006.
88. As cited by Amien Rais, *Cakrawala Islam: Antara Cita dan Fakta* (Bandung: Mizan, 1999) 49.
89. Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, 240.
90. For further information on the notion of an Islamic state proposed by Z.A. Ahmad and Mohammad Natsir following the 1959 constitutional debate see, among others, Z.A. Ahmad, *Membentuk Negara Islam* (Jakarta: Penerbit Widjaya, 1956); Cf. Mohammad Natsir, *Islam sebagai Dasar Negara* (Jakarta: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah in collaboration with Media Dakwah and University of Mohammad Natsir, 2000).
91. Compare the notion of an Islamic state proposed by some PKS cadres to that of Amien Rais. In the latter's point of view, a state can be considered as "Islamic" as long as it has at least three characteristics: first, state and society must be established on the basis of the principle of justice. Second, the state follows the *shūrā* (public deliberation) principle. Third, it should be based on the principle of brotherhood and equality. See Amien Rais, *Cakrawala Islam*, p. 47.
92. For a helpful account on PKS's vision on the implementation of Sharī'ah see, among others, Nandang Burhanuddin, *Penegakan Syari'at Islam Menurut Partai Keadilan* (Jakarta: Al-Jannah, 2003).
93. Hartono Mardjono is a cadre of the Crescent Moon and Star Party (PBB), another Islamic party led by Yusril Ihza Mahendra at that time.
94. Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, 236.
95. Mutammimul Ula, "Perspektif Penerapan Syariat Islam," *Penerapan Syariat Islam di Indonesia: Antara Peluang dan Tantangan*, eds. Salim Segaf Al-Jufri, et. al (Jakarta: Global Mediacipta in Collaboration with Pusat Konsultasi Syariah, 2004) 61-77.
96. Ula gives an example of how justice, one of the key Islamic values, can be achieved. Islam, he argues, provides the methodology to achieve justice by means of several doctrines: (1) the command to do justice in all aspects of life; (2) to be just in governance and court; (3) to choose just leaders and judges; (4) to be just in politics; (5) to be just in the division of inheritance; (6) to be just in treating fellow humans, not only towards close relatives; (7) to be incessantly just, even though towards those whom we dislike; (8) to be just in educating children; (9) to be just in economic distribution; (10) to be just in treating corpses; (11) to be just in weighing, etc. See, Ibid.
97. Ibid., 69-70.
98. Anis Matta, "Pesan dari Aceh: Reformasi Harus Dimulai dari Iman," *Sabili*, No. 15/Year XII (10 February 2005): 34-5.
99. See, for instance, Hidayat Nur Wahid, "Menerapkan Syariat Islam di Bidang Sosial Budaya dan Pendidikan," *Penerapan Syariat Islam di Indonesia*, eds. Salim Segaf Al-Jufri, et. al., 139-52; cf. Salim Segaf Al-Jufri, "Pengantar," *Penerapan Syariat Islam di Indonesia*, eds. Salim Segaf Al-Jufri, et. al., 7-22; cf. Daud Rasyid, "Peluang dan Tantangan Penerapan Syariat Islam di Indonesia," *Penerapan Syariat Islam di Indonesia*, eds. Salim Segaf Al-Jufri, et. al., 53-60; cf. Salim Segaf Al-Jufri, "Jarimah (Pidana/Kriminal)," *Penerapan Syariat Islam di Indonesia*, eds. Salim Segaf Al-Jufri, et. al., 167-191.
100. In line with the constructivist theoretical approach, while values and norms are assumed to be secondary factors, political and/or religious leaders play a more crucial role in determining which direction institutions will go. In the context of the political trajectory of PKS, there are some key themes that can be harnessed interchangeably to boost the party, depending very much on the specific need or condition. For further accounts on the constructivist approach in politics and religion, see, among others, Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger, "Does Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical Approaches to the

- Impact of Faith on Political Conflict," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2000: 641-674.
101. Of the 52 founders of PK (before it became PKS), 8 persons have a PhD degree, 9 have a Masters degree, and 24 have an undergraduate degree. Even though not educated in formal institutions, many of the rest are learned self-educated autodidacts. See DPP Partai Keadilan, *Sekilas Partai Keadilan*, 3-4.
 102. Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, 281-4.
 103. Greg Fealy and Bernhard Platzdasch, "The Masyumi Legacy: Between Islamist Idealism and Political Exigency," *Studia Islamika* 12, No. 1, 2005: 94.
 104. See among others, Merle C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia: c. 1300 to the Present* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981) 228-243. See also, Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 121-22.
 105. One of the most prominent founders of PK is Abu Ridho, who was also an important figure of DDII.
 106. Anis Malta, "Kata Pengantar," in Aay Muhammad Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, vii.
 107. See Fealy and Platzdasch, "The Masyumi Legacy," 94-5.
 108. Ibid.
 109. Ibid.
 110. Ibid.
 111. However, it was reported that the party had actually demanded the reinsertion of the Jakarta Charter into UUD 1945 and Islamic law to be established in Indonesia. See PK Sejahtera Online, "Sejarah PK Sejahtera", <http://pk-sejahtera.org/organisasi.php?op=sejarah&mn=3>, accessed on 14 January 2006.
 112. The idea of "masyarakat madani" (loosely translated as "civil society") has been explicitly mentioned in the party's vision and mission (<http://pk-sejahtera.org>). This term was first used by Anwar Ibrahim, a former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, to depict an ideal Muslim community inspired by Muhammad's modern civilization in Madinah. In Indonesia, this term was frequently used by Nurcholish Madjid.
 113. Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, 234.
 114. This famous statement has been repeatedly made by Nurcholish Madjid, following Robert N. Bellah's theoretical construct. See Nurcholish Madjid (et al.), *Kehampaan Spiritual Masyarakat Modern: Respon dan Transformasi Nilai-nilai Islam menuju Masyarakat Madani* (Jakarta: Mediacita, 2000). See also, Robert N. Bellah, *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a post-Traditional World* (New York: Harper & Row, c1970).
 115. For the PKS's holistic-integrative vision of politics see, Tim Kaderisasi PK, *Syumuliyatul Islam* (Jakarta: Tarbiyatuna, 2002).
 116. See the party's vision and mission at <http://www.pk-sejahtera.org>.
 117. Hidayat Nur Wahid, "Kedepankan Moral dan Dakwah," *Ensiklopedi Tokoh Indonesia* (<http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/h/hidayat-nur-wahid/index.shtml>), accessed on 3 January 2006.
 118. The concept of melting pot society as been firstly introduced by J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, in his *Letters from an American Farmer* (London: J.M.Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1926).
 119. This concept has been introduced by Horace Kallen in his *Cultural Pluralism and the American Idea: an Essay in Social Philosophy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1956).
 120. "Hidup Sehat dari Kacamata Islam dan Medis", (<http://www.pks-kebayorbaru.org/content/view/full/5099/6/>) accessed 3 January, 2006.
 121. See, the party's statute at http://www.pk-sejahtera.de/download/ad_pks.pdf.
 122. Tifatul Sembiring, "Grand Design Indonesia Versi PKS," 3.
 123. Ibid.
 124. Ibid.

125. Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, 247-51.
126. In the 1955 election, the supporters of the Jakarta Charter gained 40 percent of the parliamentary seats. In the 1999 election, however, the share of the proponents of the Charter was significantly lower (only 12 percent). In the 2004 election, PPP and PBB – two Islamic parties that supported the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter into the 1945 Constitution – obtained 8.2 percent and 2.6 percent of the vote respectively. The two parties together received 10.8 percent of the vote, a slight decrease from the 12 percent in the 1999 election. See Nadirsyah Hosen, "Religion and the Indonesian Constitution," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 36 (3), Oct. 2005: 427.
127. *International Herald Tribune*, 21 October 2004.
128. See, among others, Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Piagam Jakarta dan Piagam Madinah," *Kompas*, 30 November 2004: 4.
129. Untung Wahono, "Piagam Jakarta, PKS, dan Demokratisasi Referensi," *Kompas*, 14 December 2004: 4.
130. Ibid.
131. This historical event had been recorded by the Qur'an 5: 4-45.
132. Untung Wahono, "Piagam Jakarta, PKS, dan Demokratisasi Referensi."
133. Ibid.
134. Nasr, "Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism," 80.
135. It is assumed that the centrist nature of the PKS is inspired by some of the moderate leaders of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin like Yusuf al-Qardhawi, and not by al-Banna. See Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, 245-46.
136. Nonetheless, Ghassan Salamé questions the extent to which Islamists can turn into democrats. See Ghassan Salamé, "Introduction: Where are the Democrats?," in Ghassan Salamé (ed.), *Democracy without Democrats: The Renewal of Muslim Politics?* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995).
137. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Daniel Brumberg (eds.), *Islam and Democracy in the Middle East* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003).

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