

ISSN 2088-6330

Religió

JURNAL STUDI AGAMA-AGAMA

THE CHANGING PATTERN OF TERRORISM

Akhmad Najibul Khairi Sya'ie

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RECTION

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DALAM TRANSFORMASI SOSIAL

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PLURALISME AGAMA

Purwanto

Volume 02, Nomor 02, September 2012

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Religió diterbitkan oleh Jurusan Perbandingan Agama Fakultas Ushuluddin IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya. Jurnal ini terbit dua kali dalam setahun (Maret dan September). Tulisan bisa dikirim ke Redaksi Jurnal **Religió** Jurusan Perbandingan Agama Fakultas Ushuluddin IAIN Sunan Ampel, Jln. Jend. Ahmad Yani 117 Surabaya 60237 Telp. 031-8410298 Fax. 031-8413300, atau via email: religio@sunan-ampel.ac.id

Religió

Volume 2, Nomor 2, September 2012

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THE CHANGING PATTERN OF TERRORISM

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Abstrak: Perang melawan terorisme dipercaya sebagai salah satu bentuk perang dunia yang imbasnya merambah ke berbagai negara. Hal ini semakin mengkrystal paska tragedi 9/11, yakni runtuhnya gedung kembar World Trade Center di New York. Terorisme diyakini lahir dari ketidakpuasan dan ketidakadilan yang merasuk dalam tubuh sebagian masyarakat, terutama mereka yang merasa tersisihkan. Namun, pada perkembangannya, terorisme juga dimaknai sebagai kebencian terhadap Barat. Menurut Peter Berger, gerakan terorisme semakin hari semakin sulit untuk dilacak dan diantisipasi. Makalah ini ingin mengulas perubahan-perubahan yang terjadi dalam gerakan terorisme dunia, sekaligus mengurai evolusi tujuan dan misi dari gerakan tersebut.

Kata Kunci: Terorisme, Barat, al-Qaeda.

Introduction

The international war against terrorism is considered as the first genuinely global war. This is symbolized by trends such as the increasing tendency of countries to take part in international cooperation to prevent security threats. Global war against terrorism became more prominent after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the United States, referred to as 9/11. Terrorism took root due to the growing sense of dissatisfaction and injustice in society and the inability of governments to realize the hopes and demands growing in these communities (Pipes, 2001, p. 112). Reliance on ideology, whether Marxism-Leninism, nationalism or religion, has increased (Hoffman, 2006,

p. 85). These ideologies become part of an effort to legitimize the various practices of violence that become the core of terrorism.

Meanwhile, acts of terror associated with the hatred against Western domination HAVE spread, not only in the countries that are considered part of Western hegemony, but also IN countries that do not have direct links with the United States, United Kingdom, or Australia. Indonesia is an example, having been rocked by four suicide bombings associated with transnational terrorism network: the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002, the Marriot hotel bombing on 5 August 2003, Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta on 9 September 2004, and the second Bali bombing on 1 October 2005 (Tan,

2007, p. 38). This does not include a number of terrorist acts carried out in Indonesia during the year 2001 until the year 2010, which targeted public facilities which were symbols of the West, like McDonalds Restaurant, Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant, and others. Other countries have also experienced similar incidents as happened in Indonesia. For instance Turkey, Pakistan and India have experienced several acts of terror in the name of religion, as a symbol of hatred against the West.

Peter Bergen (2005, p. 10) says that the actions of terrorist groups after 9/11 tend to be less anticipated. Tactics have changed as groups adjust to the Global War against terrorism. The target of transnational terrorist groups is no longer the homeland of Western countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom or Australia, but on the assets associated with the Western countries throughout the world. Having said that, in the case of bombing in the subway station and airport in the United Kingdom, terrorist acts can still occur suddenly in Western countries.

The various examples mentioned above actually confirm that the patterns of terrorism or terrorist organisations have changed and evolved. These changes reflect the changes in the goals/objectives of terrorism, as well as the organization of terrorism, which tend to scatter after the fall of Taliban regime. Also people from a number of prominent terrorist organizations, both at the local, regional and transnational level were arrested and killed (Gunaratna, 2007, p. 437). In addition, the existence of peace agreements in several countries that have conflicts with local terrorist groups increasingly complement the

initial hypothesis that the effect of the Global War on Terrorism post-event 9/11 has changed the patterns and movements of terrorist groups around the world. The question I have addressed in this essay is how terrorist organisations have changed and evolved? Therefore, this essay will explain some of the changing pattern of terrorism/terrorist group slightly, and will focus more on the new pattern of organisational structure and command of terrorist group.

Patterns of Change

Firstly there is the changing nature of terrorist organisations' ideology and goals. Throughout history the ideologies of terrorist groups have been diverse, ranging from Marxism-Leninism, ultra-nationalism, religious-based ideology, and others (Hoffman, 2006, p. 84). Even some of terrorist organisations have mixed their ideology. For example the PKK's (the Kurdistan Workers Party) ideology is a mix of Islam, Marxism-Leninism combined with Kurdish nationalism. Another example is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Pattani rebellion in southern Thailand which has adopted an ideology that is a mix between radical Islamism and nationalism. The Nationalism-Catholicism ideology in Northern Ireland is another example. Meanwhile, there are more radical terrorists organisations such as the Red Army in Japan, based on a Marxist-Leninist ideology that operated outside Japan. Hoffman (2006, p. 85), moreover, argues that in the height of the Cold War the majority of terrorist groups are left-wing, revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideological organisations and the other terrorist groups are ethno-nationalist/separatist organisations

which happened in some countries such as in Bosnia, Chechnya, Nagorno Karabakh, and other parts of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

However, in 1990s there was a rapid increase in the number of religious terrorist groups, while on the other hand the number of ethno-nationalist terrorist groups decreased significantly. In 1994, it was reported that 16 or one-third of the 49 terrorist movements, were classified as religious terrorist movements. This number increased in 1995, with about 46 % (twenty six terrorist groups) of the fifty six groups identified as being religious terrorist organisations. The trend was increasing in 2004, with about 52 groups, or forty-six percent of terrorist organisations that existed that year, being classified as religious in character, while 32 groups, or 28% were left-wing groups, and 24 groups, or twenty-one percent were ethno-nationalist terrorist groups (Hoffman, 2006, p. 86).

Another trend shows that the ideology of terrorism tends to be 'conical' in shape in terms of Islamic-based ideology. *Jaiib Mobammed/JEM* (Army of Mohammed), a Moslem extremist group based in Pakistan and formed by Masood Azhar in early 2000, Ansar al-Islam/AI (*aka* Partisans of Islam, Helpers of Islam, Supporters of Islam), a radical Islamist group of Iraqi Kurds and Arabs formed in September 2001, the Tunisian Combatant Group/TCG or the *Jama'a Combattaante Tunisienne* aiming to form an Islamic regime in Tunisia established in 2000, are all examples of Islamic terrorist groups that were founded in the year 2000 (William, 2004, p. 177).

There were a greater number of terrorist attacks in the early years of twenty-first century, such as, the

September 11 2001 attacks, known as (9/11), the target being the World Trade Centre Tower and the Pentagon, in which more than 3000 people were killed and thousands were wounded. There was also the Madrid train bombing on 11 March 2004, in which 191 were killed and 1800 were wounded. The 7 July 2005 London bombing, also known as 7/7, was carried out by extremist Muslims.

The goals and the objectives of terrorist organisations are varied and diverse, namely, to create terror and disrupt socio-political stability in a state, to end the Western countries hegemony, separatism, and/or to form an international Islamic government. However, each group has specific objectives according to their typology and motivation. Ethno-nationalist groups (or separatist organisation) such as the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA), formed in 1959 aim at establishing a state based on Marxism in northern Spain. They have been involved in the bombing and killing of Spanish Government officials, politicians and so on. The Kurdistan Worker's Party is one of the groups that use violence and terror to gain independence from Turkey and establish a democratic Kurdish State in the Middle East. Thus, according to Williams in regional terrorism where only one nationality and country is involved, it often involves separatist or ethno-nationalist separatism. (Williams (2004, p. 39).

Ideological terrorist groups, for example The Red Brigades, which waged a campaign against the Italian Republic in the 1970s and 1980s, aimed at creating a neo-communist state and socio-economic system. Another example of this type is the German Baader-Meinhof, and the Japanese Red

Army. Examples of religious-political groups (National Liberation Organisations), are Hamas and Fatah, whose objective is to create an Islamic Republic of Palestine and ultimately dismantle the state of Israel (Ganor, 2008, pp. 271-272).

On the other hand, the new pattern of terrorist groups, known as International/transnational terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, is motivated by primarily anti-Western religious ideology (Juergensmeyer, 2003, p. 127). Their absolute objective is changing the entire international system. They tend to focus more on the desire to break and end the Western hegemony, especially by the United States of America, whose leaders are as considered to be the infidels and the enemy of Islam, and to force the United States to withdraw from Moslem lands. Another objective is to change Moslem regimes that they consider of betraying the true Islam and of coalition with the US and its allies.

The global war against terrorism led by the United States government, and its policy to act as the police of the world, who can justify all their actions, together with the US foreign policy toward the Palestine-Israel conflict (Nacos, 2001, p. 182) has raised the hatred of individuals, groups and even countries, both towards the US and its Allies. Under the Bush administration, the United States has labelled some countries as the 'axis of evil' and certain organisations as terrorist movements (Leiser, 2004, p. 200). As a consequence, dissatisfaction emerged, especially in third world countries. However, other terrorist organisations with different purposes, also still exist in some countries.

Turning to the terrorist group's target and tactic. Traditional terrorist group intend to produce a political

effect through the injury or death of the victim (Whittaker, 2003, p. 16). They want to destabilise the normal political condition and create political change in a local, regional even international through mass destruction. The objective is to pressure the authority to concede their demands (Jones, 2004, p. 30). They attacked "symbolic" targets representing the source of their hostility or kidnapped and assassinated specific people whom they considered guilty of economic exploitation or political repression.

For example left-wing terrorists like German Red Army Faction (RAF) and the Italian Red Brigades (RB) have selectively kidnapped and assassinated people whom they blamed for economic exploitation or political repression in order to attract publicity and promote a Marxist-Leninist revolution. Similarly, Hamas and Hezbollah have specific target, mostly the Israeli military that they considered as their enemy who occupy Palestinian territory and Southern Lebanon respectively.

Generally, all terrorist groups have one trait in common: They do not commit actions randomly or senselessly. Their purpose is aimed at gaining publicity (Kegley, 2000, p. 29). According to Brian Jenkins "terrorist wants a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead". Jenkins continued to argue that "Terrorist operate on the principle of the minimum force necessary, they find it unnecessary to kill many, as long as killing a few suffices for their purposes" (Cited in Hoffman, 2006, p. 270). By causing disorder, disturbing socio-political stability of a state, they hope that dramatic and shocking incidents of violence will attract attention of the

media and, in turn, of the public and government as well.

On the other hand, the new pattern of terrorist groups, known as International/transnational terrorist group, such as Al Qaeda, they targeted terror no longer in gaining publicity, but in causing carnage on massive scale (Wilkinson, 2003, p. 34). Through Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri (both are the supreme leaders of Al Qaeda), that Al Qaeda and its affiliates should "Kill Westerners. Kill American. Kill Jews" (Bergen, 2005, p. 3). This message conformed to the farwa issued on 23 February 1998 that announced the setting up of a World Islamic Front for Jihad and declared that 'it is the duty of all Muslims to kill US citizens - civilian or military-, and their allies everywhere'. Therefore, they do not have any specific target but to kill a lot of people that are assumed as Westerners, American, and Jews. The event of 9/11 is the example of international terrorist attacks which killed more than 3000 people, and thousands of people were injured.

Another new trend is that the threat of terrorist attack is shifting from military, political and diplomatic targets to economic targets (Bergen, 2005, p. 6). Al Qaeda estimated that it would cost the United States would US\$ 1 million dollar in every one dollar spent by Al Qaeda. In the event of 9/11, the United States suffered from several losses, human lives (insurance costs), property costs, emergency response and clean-up costs, health effects, temporary housing, lost employee income, lost employee income, lost expenditures, lost tax revenues, travel delays for commuters etc. Its estimated that the World Trade Centre attack cost \$ 80 billion (Enders, 2006, p. 1).

Similarly, the attacks on the U.S navy destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67) on October 12, 2000, in Aden Yemen by terrorist using small motorboat caused long impact of economic deterioration such as the decline in Yemen shipping revenue (Enders, 2006, p. 203). Moreover, the Bali bombing had impact on the stability of Indonesian national economy. The decline in tourism revenue, lost of income, the replacement costs of damaged goods and infrastructure were very costly.

The economic targets rarely appeared in traditional terrorist group. As mentioned earlier, they kidnapped or killed specific persons or figureheads that they blamed as enemies and, or attack a symbolic public infrastructure to attract media, public and in turn a government's attention.

There has been a new phenomenon occurring in terrorist groups in that some of the terrorist movements have ended their conflicts with regimes and made peace agreement to avoid being labelled as a terrorist organisation, and changed into formal organisations with the aim of enhancing their bargaining power with the authorities. However this trend is not new, having already occurred in the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) (Hoffman, 2006, p. 74). The PLO acted as an umbrella organisation, consisting of numerous militant factions as well as other Palestinian associations. The Palestine Liberation Organisation acted as a Palestinian legal representative in negotiating with Israel authorities with respect to the liberation of Palestine from Israeli control (Mannes, 2004, p. 269). The PLO had an agreement with Israel to form the Palestinian Authority to govern the domestic affairs in Gaza and the West Bank, while the PLO has

responsibility for external affairs, particularly in Lebanon (Mannes, 2004, p. 288). Similarly, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) in Indonesia, after reaching a peace agreement with Indonesian authorities, officially signed on 15 August 20....., changed into two political parties, Partai Aceh and Partai SIRA (Hillman, 2007, p. 51). Interestingly, the Aceh party (or parties) won the election and had the majority of seats in the provincial parliament.

Another example is Hezbollah which is still considered an Islamic terrorist group by the United States of America, Israel and some Western countries. It is considered similar to Al Qaeda but operates in the context of National Liberation, just like Hamas. Part of the reason for this is that, Hezbollah killed more than 240 marines in an attack on marine barracks in 1983. Both of these organisations have fought Israel in the Lebanese and Palestinian contexts, respectively (Harik, 2005, p. 1). Hezbollah has transformed itself from a radical, clandestine militia to a moderate organisation, and has participated in Lebanese general elections.

Local people see Hezbollah as a political movement and a social service that has done everything that a government should do, from collecting the garbage to running hospitals and repairing schools (Harik, 2005, p. 196). Winning hearts and minds, Hezbollah has not only armed and political wings – it also boasts an extensive social development programme. The group currently operates at least four hospitals, 12 clinics, 12 schools and two agricultural centres that provide farmers with technical assistance and training. It also has an environmental

department and an extensive social assistance programme. Medical care is also cheaper than in most of the country's private hospitals and free for Hezbollah members. Most of these institutions are located in the country's more marginalised areas, such as Beirut's southern suburbs, in South Lebanon and in the Bekaa Valley (Harik, 2005, p. 197).

The changing patterns of terrorist organisations relate to the pattern of organisational structure and command. The orthodox organisation of terrorist movements is diagrammatically represented by the pyramid (Hoffman, 2006, p. 271), which means that they were organised along the lines of the predominant hierarchical model of other organisations, existing in all political, social and religious structures in the world today. Thus the organisation was similar to that which existed in governments, corporations and the military, with the mass of the members at the bottom and the leaders at the top. There are clear divisions of authority between the leadership, officials, activists and supporters. The decisions made at the top of the international terrorist organisations were communicated to and carried out by those below, including in regional and local areas (Ganor, 2008, p. 276). In short, it is a well-defined command and control apparatus (Hoffman, 2006, p. 267).

The Lebanese Hezbollah, for example, has been known to be governed "on the national and local level by the supreme political-religious leadership, composed of a small and selected group of Lebanese ulama" (Nacos, 2006, p. 147). The Hezbollah is governed by the *Majlis al-Shura* (Consultative Assembly) which is

headed by 12 senior clerical members (including the Secretary-General who is elected every two years) with responsibility for tactical decisions and supervision of overall Hezbollah activity throughout Lebanon. Within the *Majlis al-Shura*, there existed seven specialized committees dealing with ideological, financial, military and political, judicial, informational and social affairs. In turn, the *Majlis al-Shura* and these seven committees were replicated in each of Hezbollah's three main operational areas (the Beqaa, Beirut, and the South). In December 1989, Hezbollah formed a new body known as *Majlis al-Shura al-Karar* (the Deciding Assembly) to control the administration of Hezbollah (Mannes, 2004, p. 159).

More recently, however, terrorist movements have abandoned the hierarchical structure and adopted the "leaderless resistance" (Nacos, 2006, p. 148). Sageman (2008, p. 145) calls it "Leaderless Jihad". They tend to use a linear structure rather than a hierarchical one (Hoffman, 2001, p. 418). The aim is to prevent governments from destroying the movements. These kinds of terrorist group are organised in loosely interconnected, semi independent cells that have no single commanding hierarchy.

The basic characteristic of the structure is that there is no explicit communication between cells which are otherwise acting toward the same goals (Sageman, 2008, p. 145). Members of one cell usually have little or no specific information on who else is agitating on behalf of their cause. All groups and individuals operate independently from one another and from a central command. Although, they are less competent in technique

and tactics, they have freedom and independence in decision-making and in the operation of terror attacks (Hoffman, 2006, p. 272).

Consequently, the absence of a central command authority has the potential to give a terrorist more opportunities and freedom to commit acts of violence, which, in turn, makes them more unpredictable and uncontrollable (Raufar, 2000, p. 30). However a top leader is still crucial. Leaderless movements may often have symbolic figureheads. It can be a public figure or an inspirational author, who picks generic targets and objectives, but does not actually manage or execute plans (Nacos, 2006, p. 150). Leaders communicate their intention periodically and non-specifically, including by making public pronouncements. Groups are affiliated through both formal and informal links. Decision-making and operations are often highly decentralised. A good example of this is Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda, and his deputy Ayman Al Zawahiri. They did not try to impose their authority, but nevertheless proved themselves as main figure (Migaux, 2007, p. 325). This model of terrorism is also termed "phantom cell networks", "autonomous leadership unit", "network of networks", or "lone wolves" (Hoffman, 2006, p. 271).

Al Qaeda: The "Network of Networks" Terrorism

Al Qaeda means "the Base", which is based in Afghanistan, is the most visible manifestation of the terrorist threat. It operates as a transnational terrorism organisation comprised of multinational individuals and fundamentalist Sunnis calling for global Jihad with multinational

members (Mannes, 2004, p. 18). This transnational terrorist group is the best example of how the terrorist movement has evolved and changed from the hierarchical model terrorist group into its new incarnation, the "network of networks" terrorist group (Hoffman, 2004, 552). Al Qaeda is the most threatening terrorist group in relation to the stability of world security. To exist, adapt and survive, it has evolved and reorganised through several stages. The first was top-down command to manage its tactics and strategies. The second was a "network of networks". The third was by using a guerrilla base and the last was interlinks with another transnational or separatist rebel groups (Gumaratna, 2002, p. 57).

Structurally, Al Qaeda was a unitary organisation (Hoffman, 2006, p. 283), with a centralised, top-down organisation (Gumaratna, 2003, p. 134), which had many characteristics of a hierarchical organisation. It had permanent installations, fixed structure, standardised methods and regular procedures. The structure of Al Qaeda consisted of the *emir* as the top leader, Osama bin Laden, advised by *Majlis al-Shura*, or a consultative council, consisting of high echelon apparatus and very experienced cadres, such as Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Ayoub al-Iraqi, Abu Hafs al-Khabir (Gumaratna, 2002, p. 57). Below the *Majlis al-Shura* there were four committees: a military one that was responsible for recruiting, training, procuring, transporting and launching military operations as well as developing tactics and strategies, a finance, a religious and a media committee (Mannes, 2004, p. 35).

In August 1996, al-Qaeda announced its jihad to expel foreign troops and interests from what they considered Islamic lands. Bin Laden

issued a *fatwa*, which amounted to a public declaration of war against the United States of America and any of its allies, and began to refocus al-Qaeda's resources towards large-scale, propagandist strikes (Gumaratna, 2002, p. 42).

On February 23, 1998, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, a leader of an Egyptian Islamic Jihad, along with three other Islamist leaders, co-signed and issued a *fatwa* (binding religious edict) calling on Muslims to kill Americans and their allies where they could and when they could (Wilkinson, 2006, p. 5). Under the banner of the World Islamic Front for Combat against the Jews and Crusaders they declared:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque [in Jerusalem] and the holy mosque [in Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, 'and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,' and 'fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah.' (Hoffman, 2006, p. 95).

Al-Qaeda has attacked targets, civilian and military, in various countries, most notably, the September 11 attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. in 2001. The U.S. government responded by launching the War on Terror. According to the results of the Strategic Survey, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies based in London, at least 18,000 Al Qaeda members were

trained in camps in Afghanistan during the period between 1996 and 2001 (Hoffman, 2004, p. 552). However, this number has been reduced as most of the cadres were killed and arrested as a result of the global war against terrorism. In 2001, Gumaratna stated that the core force of Al Qaeda consisted of more than 3000 members, along with linkages with terrorist groups that spread out all over the world, in at least 60 countries (Gumaratna, 2003, p. 117).

Wilkinson (2005, pp. 41-42) identifies Al Qaeda major affiliates and support groups: "Egypt (*Jihad Islamic Group*), Algerian (*GIA and GSPC*), Libya (*Libyan Islamic Fighting Group*), Lebanon (*Asbat al-Ansar*), Kashmir/Pakistan (*Lashkar e Taryiba, Harakat al Mujahideen, Lashkar e Jhangri, Jaish e Mohammad*), Indonesia (*Jemaah Islamiyah - Islamic Group-*), Iraq (*Al Qaeda Jihad Organisation Mesopotamia, Ansar al Islam*), Yemen (*Islamic Army of Yemen*), Morocco (*Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group*), Afghanistan (*Hezb al Islam/Gulbuddin*), Saudi Arabia (*Al Qaeda in Arabian peninsula*), Europe (*various localized networks including the Secret Organisation of Al Qaeda in Europe*), Africa (*various localized networks especially in East Africa*)".

William (2003, pp. 83-84) argues that the "link from, or with Al Qaeda" has several characteristics including funding for a spiritual leader's activities. Al Qaeda, for example, has provided military training in Afghanistan, Pakistan or elsewhere or trainers at a local level. It has financed operational and logistical support, such as the provision of weapons.

Al Qaeda also has attempted to strengthen its regional operation. William (2005, pp. 83-84) also describes the kind of connections

between regional terrorist groups and individuals as including "affiliated" groups that are considered as part of Al Qaeda networks, which operate in Muslim societies or countries with Islamic communities, and "associated" free actors, such as Ramzie Yousef the bomber of the World Trade Centre in 1993, who was supported by Al Qaeda. He (siapa?) also describes other connections such as the "empathetic" one, which consists of a group of terrorists driven by local problems, but who have developed links with Al Qaeda, such as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia. This movement has Al Qaeda representatives in some regions, such as Omar Al Faruq. Gumaratna adds another type which consists of Al Qaeda cells operating in the West (Gumaratna (2002, p. 95). All these types of connection involve the sharing of expertise, the transfer of resources, discussion of strategy and even the conducting of joint operations.

Decentralisation

Since the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, followed by Iraq in March 2003, the Al Qaeda operational home base was destroyed. More than half of its leaders and higher echelon members were killed or arrested, such as Abu Zubaidah, Khaled Sheikh Muhammad, Abdullah al Rahim al Nishiri, Ramzi bi al Shibh and Taufik bin Attash (Gumaratna, 2003, p. 512). In addition more than 3400 cadres were killed or arrested (Finders, 2006, p. 189). Moreover, financial support was reduced as their assets had been frozen. As a consequence, the power of Al Qaeda weakened. However, Al Qaeda senior leader, Ayman al Zawahiri denies this, and claims that Al Qaeda is still strong and capable of carrying out

attacks at least twice per year (Hoffman, 2006, p. 283).

Nevertheless, Al Qaeda did suffer from the loss of its operational leaders and main base. In order to continue existing, Al Qaeda has changed its strategy. The weakened Al Qaeda has relied on individual, regional and local terrorist groups worldwide to retain and regain its strong presence. Therefore Al Qaeda has formed networks with local and regional radical groups aiming to influence and transform a global *jihadi* mindset (Gunaratna, 2007, p. 437). These networks cover leadership, planning and operational matters, financial matters, training and equipment support as well as propaganda and several other functions (Gunaratna, 2007, p. 438).

Al Qaeda has decentralised, deregulated and regionalised. All local, regional terrorist group networks and individuals are semi-autonomous, being able to make their own decisions and operate independently or, at the very least, follow broad general directions. The supreme leader, Osama bin Laden does not have to be in command or have central control (Migaux, 2007, p. 325). Jessica Stern has noted:

"In one article on the 'culture of jihad' available on-line, a Saudi Islamist urges bin Laden sympathizers to take action without waiting for instructions. 'I do not need to meet the Sheikh (Osama bin Laden) and ask his permission to carry out some operation', he writes, 'the same as I do not need permission to pray, or to think about killing Jews and the Crusaders that gather on our lands' (Quoted in Nicos, 2006, p. 150).

One of the focuses of this essay is on the links between Al Qaeda and terrorist groups existing in Southeast

Asia. Abuza (2003, p. 135) identifies several reasons why this region became one of the main focus points in Al Qaeda's terrorist campaign. Most of the countries in this region are considered as "countries of convenience". These countries are very conducive to operation at a local level since they suffer from a lack of law and order, poorly regulated banking, increasing corruption especially in security and the police department, border problems and the easy availability of weapons. Secondly, the aim is the spread of the Islamic fundamentalist views, such as *Wabbahism* especially *Deobandism*.

Al Qaeda has sought out Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Group) and it has become his close ally in the region. Most of the members of Jemaah Islamiyah are the remnants of Mujahidin fighters who trained and joined the war in Afghanistan. Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Group) is believed to have cells spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand (Sabastebski, 2005, p. 181). Jemaah Islamiyah has its roots in *Darul Islam* (DI, meaning "House of Islam"), a radical movement in Indonesia in the 1940s that aimed to establish a unified Islamic nation based on Shari'ah among the countries of Southeast Asia (Hoffman, 2004, p. 550).

It was formally founded on January 1, 1993, by Jemaah Islamiyah leaders, Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar. Both are strongly influenced by Osama bin Laden's terrorist ideology and methodology, aiming to create an Islamic state comprising the Southeast Asia region of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Southern Philippines and southern Thailand (Sabastebski, 2005, p. 181). Soon after its founding,

Jemaah Islamiyah became an Al-Qaeda affiliate, receiving financial and material support from the group. Several top Jemaah Islamiyah operatives even received instruction in Afghan training camps. In terms of terrorist action, the Jemaah Islamiyah has been responsible for a number of recent and deadly terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia, including the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002, the Marriott Hotel on 5 August 2003, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta on 9 September 2004, and the second Bali bombing on 1 October 2005 (Tan, 2007, p. 38). It has also been responsible for the newest bombing on the JW. Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotel on 17 July 2009.

In its first founding, Jemaah Islamiyah employed a top-down hierarchical organisation. The leader (*Amir*), a leadership council (*Markaz*) and consultative councils (*Shura*) oversaw four geographic divisions (*Mantiqi*). Each *Mantiqi* was divided into smaller sub-groups (as represented below) which administered Jemaah Islamiyah activity appropriate to their area. *Mantiqi* I and IV were focused on fundraising. *Mantiqi* II was focused on leadership and recruitment. *Mantiqi* III was focused on training (Sageman, 2004, p. 140). This mirrored the organisation within Al Qaeda, due to the effect of the global war against terrorism. Because their leaders and members were arrested, Jemaah Islamiyah transformed into cells and clandestine networks or morphed into local groups.

Jemaah Islamiyah has a strategy of recruitment and expansion of cells, religious indoctrination and training of its members, and instigation of sectarian conflict (Abuza, 2009). Guntur Romli, reinforcing what Abuza argued, states that in order to expand

their networks and cells, Jemaah Islamiyah tends to use certain recruitment patterns. Firstly, they use ideology as an instrument. Generally, they tend to indoctrinate the ideology of terror, violence, hatred, and the desire to eliminate those who are considered enemies. This ideology resonates with the *bay'at* system (total loyalty to the leader). Secondly, they use kinship as an instrument. As a terrorist network, Jemaah Islamiyah is a closed-network organisation operating underground by storing data and strategies. The main principle on which it is built is the trust that derives from family and kinship. There is evidence that the Bali bombers are siblings, namely Amrozi, Ali Ghurfon and Ali Imron (Romli, 2007, p. 15). Moreover, recruiting, training, indoctrination, financial and operational links between the Jemaah Islamiyah and other militant groups, such as al-Qaeda, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Misuari Renegade/Breakaway Group (MRG/MBG) and the Philippine Rajah Sulaiman movement (RSM) have existed for many years, and continue to this day.

In addition, Jemaah Islamiyah has shown the ability to operate with different patterns and has on occasion morphed into local terrorist groups. In Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah has transformed charities and non-governmental agencies (NGOs), such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, created in Yogyakarta 1999 into radical Islamic organisations. This includes established publisher *Witadah Press*, a magazine (*Risalah Mujahidin*), and also *Ar-Rahmah Media*. Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia also serves as a link between *Jemaah Islamiyah* and Saudi financiers. Many Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia leaders

hold or have held concurrent positions in Saudi charities and their Indonesian counterparts have been used to support terrorist activities. These include the Saudi Al-Haramain and the International Islamic Relief Organization, and two Indonesian charities, KOMPAK and the Medical Emergency Relief Charity (Abuza, 2003, p. 139). Like Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah has evolved into a separatist group in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines. While in Malaysia, Jemaah Islamiyah was transformed into an organization of Islamic doctrine.

Al Qaeda also relies on individuals especially in diaspora communities to commit terrorist acts, especially in Europe (Bergen, 2005, p. 10). The individual may be less competent but he/she is still capable of carrying out more bloody terrorist acts. For example, the Madrid bombing was carried out by a Moroccan migrant. This was also the case with the immigrant who was responsible for the London subway bombing.

Before the event of 9/11, Al Qaeda was backed up by two models of cell members: support networks which distributed propaganda, fund raised, trained supported and provided safe housing, and secondly operational networks which conducted the terrorist acts. (Gunaratna, 2005, p. 43). Each cell had its own duties and responsibilities to succeed in terrorist attacks.

However, in the post 9/11 period, the support networks in Europe and North America were transformed into operational networks. This was apparent in the Madrid bombing which was conducted by support networks which had changed into operational networks. They were free to act and conduct terror

operations without any instruction from the supreme leader. Esa al Britani, the leader of a terrorist cell, for example, avoided using mobile phones, never had credit card or a bank account and always moved from home to home in order to avoid the supervision and surveillance of government, police and security force (Gunaratna, 2005, p. 55).

This means that Al Qaeda networks and cells still exist as ideological movements in Europe and North America (and other places), although they are no longer present as formal organisations anymore.

Conclusion

From the short description above, the terrorist groups still exist and are present everywhere. It may be in the colour of non-state terrorist movement, ideological groups, religio-political groups or religion-based ideology. Furthermore, some of these groups have evolved and morphed into the new patterns of terrorist movement. They have new tactics, strategies, loose organisation, decentralised command and control adjusting to the global war against terrorism. Their terror action is tend to be less anticipated and unpredictable. The best example of this is Al Qaeda and its affiliates which are motivated by anti-Western religious ideology.

In this context, I have considered concentration and full alert needed by Western countries in particular, as well as other countries around the world, to specifically give attention to the global war against terrorism. Hit and run tactics practiced by the terrorist organisation provided a valuable lesson and demonstrated that the global war on terrorism needs to be improved. This is because of the spirit of Jihad and ready to die for honour, nation,

and religion are the main reasons for the perpetrators of terror, both at national, regional, or transnational levels post-event 9/11.

The assumption that by invading and destroying the states where the terrorist organizations are based, as was done in Afghanistan or Iraq, terrorism would end has proven to be an assumption that is not entirely true. Similarly, the capturing and killing of several high-ranking terrorists from organizations like Al Qaeda, or Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Southeast Asia does not guarantee an end to terrorism.

The arrest of terrorist top leaders, affiliates and cells do not necessarily mean that terrorism will disappear and remove its threat. In fact, the invasion by the United States and its allies of Afghanistan, and Iraq, the arrests and killing of a number of members of terrorist organisation, had led to changes in terrorist organizations, patterns, strategies and targets, which in turn will complicate the efforts of many countries in countering terrorism in the context of the global war against terrorism.

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