

AL-MANAR

JURNAL SEJARAH DAN KEBUDAYAAN ISLAM

- **ANGKA ABUJID SEBAGAI KUNCI PEMBUKA DALAM MEMBACA PRASASTI PERIODE ISLAM DI JAWA TIMUR**
Masyhudi
- **SEJARAH DAN PERKEMBANGAN GERAKAN AHMADIYAH LAHORE INDONESIA (GAI) TAHUN 1924-1966**
Moh Haris Hariyadi
- **INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON AHMADIYAH AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIO-RELIGIOUS CHANGES**
Akhmad Najibul Khairi Sya'ie
- **ANTHONY GIDDENS: Telaah Kritis terhadap Dualisme**
Lilik Zulaicha
- **PENGARUH PERADABAN ISLAM TERHADAP KEMAJUAN PERADABAN EROPA PADA MASA KLASIK**
Abdul Aziz Medan
- **PERADABAN LOKAL MENUJU GLOBAL (Studi Tentang Cita dan Realita Peradaban Islam)**
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DAFTAR ISI

ANGKA ABUJID SEBAGAI KUNCI PEMBUKA DALAM MEMBACA PRASASTI PERIODE ISLAM DI JAWA TIMUR	1
Masyhudi	1
SEJARAH DAN PERKEMBANGAN GERAKAN AHMADIYAH LAHORE INDONESIA (GAI) TAHUN 1924-1966	17
Moh Haris Hariyadi	17
INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON AHMADIYAH AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIO-RELIGIOUS CHANGES	31
Akhmad Najibul Khairi Sya'ie	31
ANTHONY GIDDENS: Telaah Kritis terhadap Dualisme	43
Lilik Zulaicha	43
PENGARUH PERADABAN ISLAM TERHADAP KEMAJUAN PERADABAN EROPA PADA MASA KLASIK	53
Abdul Aziz Medan	53
PERADABAN LOKAL MENUJU GLOBAL (Studi Tentang Cita dan Realita Peradaban Islam)	62
Muhamdi	62

Tahun 1960 Kesehatan Minhadjurahman Djojosegito sudah mulai menurun sehingga kepemimpinannya diganti oleh HM Bachroem. Di dalam kepemimpinannya ada gebrakan untuk melakukan kaderisasi dengan dibentuknya AMAL (Angkatan Muda Ahmadiyah Lahore) dan juga diberesapa daerah pada 28 Pebruari 1965. Namun dalam prakteknya kaderisasi ini berjalan lambat dan belum bisa berkembang. Sehubungan dengan itu maka ada inisiatif untuk mendatangkan mubalig dari Lahore, namun juga gagal karena terkendal masalah politis.⁴⁹ Kemudian Kegiatan GAI adalah mengadakan pengajian yang bernama *Sunday Morning Class* oleh mubalig Muhammad Irshad. Kemudian terbit bulletin bulanan bernama *Study Islam* 17 Januari 1966 di Jakarta yang sudah mendapat izin dari Departemen Penerangan No. 0173/SK/DPHAM/SIT/1966.⁵⁰

Sebelumnya, 6 November 1963 Departemen Agama RI melayangkan surat pada Minhadjurahman Djojosegito perihal aliran Amadiyah Lahore. Setelah mengirrimkan semua berkas yang diperlukan pada 25 Desember 1963, termasuk keterangan perbedaan dengan Ahmadiyah Qadian dan hubungan GAI (secara struktural) dengan *Ahmadiyya Anjuman Ishti Islam Lahore* di Pakistan. Waktu itu Mihadjurahman Djojosegito menjabat sebagai Ketua Kehormatan. Pada 21 Pebruari 1966, Departemen Agama RI menjawab dengan mengeluarkan surat No: L-2/3/368/66 mengenai hubungan GAI dan Departemen Agama. Pad tanggal 21 Juni 1966 Minhadjurahman Djojosegito meninggal dunia. Di Jakarta, 15 Nopember 1966, GAI terdaftar sebagai ormas dengan No: TP-574/6/1966.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Ibid.
⁵⁰ Nanang RI Iskandar. *Dasa Windu Gerakan Ahmadiya Lahore Indonesia 1928-2008*. 55.
⁵¹ Ibid. 52-56.

INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON AHMADIYAH AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIO-RELIGIOUS CHANGES

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ABSTRACT: *Ahmadiyah dianggap sebagai sekte Islam yang sudah menyimpang. Pemeluk Ahmadiyah adalah minoritas di Indonesia. Karena menjadi kelompok minoritas banyak permasalahan yang dihadapi oleh para pengikut Ahmadiyah, termasuk dalam menghadapi beberapa sekte Islam yang intoleran terhadap perbedaan dan kebijakan yang dikeluarkan oleh negara. Artikel ini menjelaskan tentang beberapa perubahan kondisi sosial-keagamaan di Indonesia akibat munculnya sempalan Islam yang diadopsi dari India ini dan ajaran-ajaran yang disebarkannya. Selain itu, artikel ini juga membahas tentang kebijakan pemerintah akibat reaksi dari kelompok-kelompok intoleran di Indonesia.*

Keywords: *Ahmadiyah, Indonesian policies, socio-religious changes*

A. Introduction

Ahmadiyah is a sect and movement in Islam that originated from India, arrived in Indonesia around 1924 (Zulkarnain, 2005, p. 12), which believes some doctrines (*al-Mahdi al-Mau'ud*⁵², the prophecy of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, revelation, and jihad) are different from the majority of Muslims. Those beliefs have made other groups disturbed, and caused controversy among the Muslim community in Indonesia. According to the Council of Indonesia's *Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or MUI)* issued *Fatwa*⁵³, *Ahmadiyah* is "a deviant sect of Islam", false and misleading (Assyaukanie, 2009, p. 1). As a minority religious community that identifies with Islam, *Ahmadiyah*, has experienced increasing tension and hostility from conservative Islamic groups due to their doctrines and teachings. It is reported that they have experienced ups and downs in their religious activities. There was a time when the *Ahmadis*⁵⁴ could carry out their teachings and beliefs without interference or physical threats. They were harassed and had mosques and property vandalised. The most recent event was an attack on February 6, 2011 at Cikeusik, Pandeglang, Banten that left 3 *Ahmadis* dead.

The problem faced by the followers of *Ahmadiyah* is a matter that often faced by minorities group. Giddens (1993, p. 489) indicates that members of minority groups are

⁵² *Al-Mahdi al-Mau'ud*: Promised Messiah

⁵³ *Fatwa*: An Islamic legal opinion issued by a Muslim jurist.

⁵⁴ *Ahmadis* refers to people who follow the teachings of *Ahmadiyah*.

disadvantaged compared to dominant groups in society. These minority groups suffer discrimination and subordination that created a shared sense of collective identity and common burdens. They are discriminated based on physical and/or cultural traits that set them apart and are identified as different by the dominant group. Moreover, Cao and Morell (2010, p. 4), argue that minorities group suffer from "the lack of civic right", this is also compounded by discrimination, spatial separation or in legislation.

The government should have to follow neutrality in its policies towards all beliefs, and to afford equal rights to their citizens (Salim, 2007, p. 115), in the context of *Ahmadiyah* minority, however, these principles appear to be absent. They are treated less fairly than the majority group. Policies that are enacted are discriminatory and do not protect the rights of minority citizens. For example, Letter of the Director General Bimas Islam, the Department of Religion, on the prohibition on spreading the teachings of *Ahmadiyah*, in 20 Sept 1984. Most recently, the governments issued joint decree 2008 as a warning to *Ahmadiyah* followers to stop their activities (Crouch, 2009, p. 10). Ironically, such those policies do not protect and guarantee their right as a citizen to perform their religious teachings and to worship according to their religion or belief. Moreover, those policies were used by Islamic radical group as a basis to act violence on *Ahmadiyah* followers. Consequently, according to Azra (2008)⁵⁵, religious minorities (such as *Ahmadiyah*) have a psychology of fear when dealing with the majority. Such a psyche is formed not only because of their vulnerable position compared with the dominant group, but also because the attitudes of the majority can threaten the existence of minority groups.

This essay will examine the state regulation on *Ahmadiyah's* minority and its impact on *Ahmadiyah* members in Indonesia. Moreover this essay is divided into two parts. Firstly; the overview of *Ahmadiyah* in Indonesia and secondly; *MUI's* *Fatwa* and the government's policies and their impact on socio-religious changes.

B. *Ahmadiyah* in Indonesia

The *Ahmadiyah* movement was established in India by an Indian Islamic scholar Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in 1888. The group believes that the founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, is a prophet and messiah who received revelations from God, which are different from mainstream Muslim beliefs. According to Zulkarnain (2005, p. 58) *Ahmadiyah* was

established in the decline of the Muslim society in India in the fields of religion, social politics, and economy, particularly after the Indian revolution in 1857 that led to the win of the East India Company. In 1914, *Ahmadiyah* split into two major branches due to different interpretations of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's teachings and prophecy claims. The majority, known as *Jamaat-i Ahmadiyah* or the Qadianis stayed in Qadian, is considered to be the more radical faction because it accepts the claim that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet. While the other faction *Ahmadiyah Anjuman Ishaat-I Islam* (the Lahore), is considered to be the more moderate because it accepts Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a reformer, not as a prophet.

Ahmadiyah thoughts were brought to Indonesia in 1924 by some Indonesian students who had pursued their study at *Ahmadiyah* School Qadian, India (Zulkarnain, 2005, p. 170). In Indonesia, the Lahore branch known as *Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia* (GAI), concentrated their mission in Java in an effort to counter Christianity. The Qadiani branch established an organization *Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia* (JAI) that works mostly in Sumatra, West Java and Lombok Island (Mustafa et al, 2005, p. 85). *Ahmadiyah* claims to have established 235 branches with 300.000 to 400.000 followers in 2000 (Uyun in Budiwanti, 2009, p. 10). However, even if *Ahmadiyah* has up to 400,000 members, this is a relatively small number in the context of the 240-million majority Muslim population of Indonesia.

Since its arrival, some scholars have opposed it. These scholars say that *Ahmadiyah* doctrines are contrary to the basic principles of Islam and even beyond Islamic teaching, such opposition continues, and this has often led to followers resorting to violence. However, in the Old order and New Order regime, acts of violence against *Ahmadiyah* followers have rarely occurred. According to Beck (2005, p. 241), during the period when the first followers came to Indonesia, there was brief cooperation between *Ahmadiyah* and *Muhammadiyah* organisations. *Ahmadiyah* was perceived as partner in Islamic education development and as a counter movement to Christian missionaries. In 1974, however, circumstances changed: the existence of *Ahmadiyah* in Indonesia piqued after the conference of *Rabitah 'Alam Islami* (The World Muslim League), held in Mecca, recognized that *Ahmadiyah* as a "deviant sect of Islam". This is because of three important things: the belief that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet, a misguided the interpretation of the Qur'an, and assuming that Jihad had been withdrawn. In addition, the conference also encouraged Muslim countries to prohibit the *Ahmadiyah* (Mustafa et al, 2005, p. 90).

⁵⁵ See Gatra Weekly Magazine. <http://www.gatra.com/2008-10-01/artikel.php?id=118842>. Viewed on 4 June 2011.

MUI's Fatwa and Government Policies and Its Impact on Socio-religious Changes

MUI was first established in West Java in 1958, created as national institution under the Department of Religion in 1975, intended to become an instrument in order to control Muslim religious leaders and giving religious legitimacy to the policies of the New Order. This Islamic religious institution (which was fully supported by government) has played role in the case of Ahmadiyah. According to Susanto (2006, p. 171), there are three great powers that have become a threat to the *Ahmadiyah*, namely the power of the State (represented by the Ministry of Religious Affairs), the power of religious authority (MUI), and the power of the mass public (Radical Islamic Group). The MUI issued fatwa on Ahmadiyah (No. 05/Kep/MUNAS/MUI/1980) in June 1980, which described *Ahmadiyah* as "a deviant sect of Islam", false and misleading. The Ministry of Religious Affairs also upheld the decision in a letter in which they stated that the *Ahmadiyah* is a heretical sect on the 20th September 1984. Following to the issuance of this circular, some district Attorney's offices were merely assigned to oversee the activities of the Ahmadiyah group in their particular regions (Susanto, 2006, p. 172).

Basically, both the MUI fatwa and the Department of Religious Affairs circular were not in line with the general policy of the New Order regime that required religious harmony (Assyaukanic, 2009, p. 6). It was reported that the New Order government was not willed with the fatwa as it negatively impacted to the government's effort to build religious harmony in the country. For example, Soeharto was angry due to the fatwa of MUI on "the presence in the Christmas celebration". In the *Ahmadiyah* context, however, it was evidenced that the issue of the letter of Religious Affairs Department on *Ahmadiyah* was due to pressure from the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia who had requested the legal prohibition of the sect based on the *Rabithah Alami Islami* recommendation (Susanti, 2008, p. 18).

The Soeharto regime seemingly had a strong grip on how to handle religious differences and minority groups. Although the MUI fatwa and Religious Affairs Department circular letter widely incited hatred against members of *Ahmadiyah*; this did not lead to an outbreak of open conflict or violence against the *Ahmadis*. It was noted that in 1981 the vice caliph of *Ahmadiya*, Mirza Mubarak Ahmad, visited Indonesia and went to some *Ahmadiyah* locations in Java, Bali and Sumatra (Mustafa et al. 2005). However, during Soeharto's regime there were few cases where *Ahmadiyah* was discredited or assaulted. For example, in September 1988, a *Ahmadiyah* mosque in Garut was attacked,

resulting in damage, and the Muslim majority often threatened *Ahmadiyah* members. Despite minor attacks like this, *Ahmadiyah* members in general were quite safe.

After the downfall of Soeharto in 1998, the position of the MUI was quite independent from the state (Assyaukanic, 2009, p. 6). However, the MUI has greatly influenced government policies, especially during the Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration. It can be understood from his speech during the 7th National Congress of the MUI on 26 July 2005:

"We open our hearts and minds to receiving the thoughts, recommendations and fatwas from the MUI and ulama (Islamic Scholars) at any time, either directly to me or the minister of religious affairs or to other branches of government. We want to place MUI in a central role in matters regarding the Islamic faith, so that it becomes clear what the difference is between areas that are the preserve of the state and areas where the government or state should heed the fatwa from the MUI and ulama" (Quoted in Crisis Group Asia Briefing No 78, 7 July 2008).

Under the government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the MUI played a more influential role in policy making than it ever had in the past. Some of the fatwas issued by the MUI were used as a basis for law enforcement by the attorney general or other departments. This link to government was acknowledged by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in relation to the government's policy on *Ahmadiyah*.

In 29 July 2005, MUI issued a second fatwa on *Ahmadiyah*, soon after the attacks on Mubarak campus where the centre of the group is located, in Parung, Bogor in July 15, 2005. According to Ma'ruf Amin, the Chairman of the Fatwa Commission, the assault experienced by *Ahmadiyah* followers was caused by the provocative actions of *Ahmadiyah* groups. He considered, it is reasonable if the annual meeting (*falsahsalanah*), which was attended by 11 thousand members of the *Ahmadiyah* community has caused outrage. He then stated that the attacks arose because there is no total ban from the government. The Circular letter from the Department of Religion 1984 also could not prevent the activities of the *Ahmadiyah* movement. Therefore, the MUI should have to reaffirm the MUI fatwa 1980 (Mustafa et al, 2005, p. 148), by reasserting that *Ahmadiyah* is a deviant sect. Furthermore, the fatwa affirmed that the government is obliged to ban the dissemination of the *Ahmadiyah* teachings throughout Indonesia.

This second fatwa raised more public awareness about *Ahmadiyah* as a deviant sect, since it involved the government intensive interference in legitimizing the fatwa into a joint decree 2008. Prior to this joint decree, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had

initially instructed the Team of Coordinating Board for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society (*Tim Bakorpakem, Badan Koordinasi Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan*)⁵⁶ to conduct a survey on *Ahmadiyah*. In its survey and investigation, this body has used the MUI *fatwa* issued in 1980 and 2005 as the basis, which lead to the conclusion that the *Ahmadiyah* had truly deviated from Islam. The *Bakorpakem* also recommended to the prohibition of organizations, activities, teachings and books of *Ahmadiyah*, and urged the Minister of Religious Affairs, Attorney General and Ministry of Home Affairs to disband the *Ahmadiyah*. This triggered some Islamic groups, such as *Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front)*, *Forum Umat Islam (Moslem Forum)*, *Laskar Jihad*, *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* and *Hizbut Tahrir*, to use the *Bakorpakem* recommendations to put more pressure on the government to dissolve *Ahmadiyah* immediately. They were also intensively lobbying parliament members, the ministry of religion, the Attorney general's office and other policy-makers, arguing that the existence of *Ahmadiyah* endangered other Muslims beliefs (Plazdasch, 2011, p. 10).

After long debate, in June 9, 2008, the government issued a new regulation in the form of *Surat Keputusan Bersama* (the Joints Ministerial Decree) signed by the Minister of Religious Affairs, the State Attorney and the Minister of Internal Affairs. The main point of the decree is:

"to give warning and to order followers, members, and/or members of the executive body of the JAI along with their confession as Muslims, to stop the spreading any interpretation and activities which are deviant to the foundation of Islamic doctrines such as spreading the belief on the existence of new prophet with new teaching after the Prophet of Muhammad".

In addition, the decree affirmed the followers of *Ahmadiyah* who do not heed the warnings and instruction above will be subject to sanctions in accordance with laws and regulations. Aside from issuing a warning to the *Ahmadis*, the decree also warned to citizens to maintain religious harmony and not undertake that violate the laws, and threatened those who do not heed the warning will also be subject to legal sanctions (Crisis Group Asia Briefing No 78, 7 July 2008).

⁵⁶*Bakorpakem* was established in 1994 by a Decision of the Attorney General, under then President Soeharto's New Order regime. Its goal is to supervise and monitor the affairs of religious minorities that it considers to have deviated from the accepted teachings of an established religion or that promote heresy. It was intended to meet both periodically and on a 'needs basis', whenever an issue concerning aliran sesat (deviant groups) and aliran kepercayaan (mystical beliefs) arise.

From the beginning, the government's involvement in the case of *Ahmadiyah*, has faced opposition and criticism from moderate Muslims and human rights activists. The government's involvement in managing religion has violated basic freedoms of citizens specifically the right to believe in certain religions. Despite the fact that are explicitly guaranteed in the 1945 constitution. Article 29 paragraph 2 of the 1945 Constitution clearly states that *"the State guarantee the independence of each resident to embrace their religious teachings and to worship according to their religion or belief"*. Article 28 paragraph 1 and 2 of the 1945 Constitution also gives the freedom for everyone to embrace religion and worship according to their religion, and give freedom to express thoughts, belief, in accordance with his conscience.

However, the proponents of the Joint Ministerial Decree 2008 argued that *Ahmadiyah* has violated the Indonesian Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 which prohibits intentional proselytizing of any belief if their doctrines propounded and practiced are inconsistent with the fundamental tenets of the respective (Susanti, 2008, p. 35).

Pros and cons of the Joint Ministerial Decree still have to continue, but certainly the Joint Decree had been issued, and will undoubtedly have an impact on the minority *Ahmadiyah*. Many people have been anxious about the implications of this policy and question whether it would justify more social horizontal conflicts in the grass root and be used as a 'legal' argument in completion to that of 'religious' argument from the MUI's *fatwa*. It has been reported that the MUI *fatwa* was used by the militant groups to conduct persecution of the *Ahmadiyah* community in many parts of Indonesia. In 2003, it is noted about 73 households were attacked in East Lombok where 23 houses and one mosque were destroyed by the mob. After the attack some schools in Selong, East Java, East Lombok refused to allow *Ahmadis* student back into their schools. In July and September 2007 there were at least two attacks on the *Ahmadiyah* community in West Java that destroyed more than 70 buildings including houses, mosques and dormitory. In every statement given by the *Ahmadiyah* opponents and every local attorney's decision in local bans always used the *fatwa* as their basis (Susanti, 2008, p. 34). Habib Abdurrahman Assegaf, the leader of the mob in Parung attacks said: *"our movement is purely based on the MUI fatwa"*. (Asyasyaukanie, 2009, p. 9). Those phenomenon confirmed that there is strong relation between MUI *fatwa* and act of violence.

If the MUI *fatwa* became the basis to act of violence, so it is logic if the issue of the Joint Decree will lead to more violence. This is because the strong legality of the Joint Decree which was signed by three ministers. According to *Setara* Institute (Institute

for Democracy and Peace), the incidents of violations to freedom of religion/beliefs in 2008 were mostly triggered by the Joint that occurred were mostly on *Ahmadiyah* (193 incidents); meanwhile, the other 72 incidents did not have anything to do with *Ahmadiyah*. From 193 incidents related with *Ahmadiyah*, 48 incidents happened before the issuance of Joint Ministerial Decree and 145 incidents happened after the issuance.

The fact that the number of acts of violations mounted after the issuance shows that the Joint Ministerial Decree has created serious implications to *Ahmadiyah* community. Moreover, the Decree has been used as a mean to legitimize the persecutions and intolerance (Hasani, 2009, pp. 32-33). In Cigedug, Garut, violence against the *Ahmadis* also lead to coercion to abandon their doctrine. Coercion is done by citizens and certain people organization. Ahmad, an *Ahmadiyah* congregation of CigedugGarut, for example, explained, that there were about 30 people forced to leave the *Ahmadiyah* sect with the threat of arson and murder⁵⁷. The persecution against *Ahmadiyah* culminated in 6 February 2011, at Cikeusik, Pandeglang, Banten, causing the death of 3 *Ahmadis*.

According to the researchers *Setara* Institute, Ismail Hasani, the existence of this decree also has become the legitimacy of local government's decision to perform acts of discrimination against the *Ahmadiyah* community. In addition, Ismail says, violence against *Ahmadis* occurred because local governments often use the *Ahmadiyah* issue as their own political interests to gather public support. When the government is accommodating to certain groups, the government deemed to have been accomplished (International Crisis Group, 2008, p. 19). According to *KontraS* (The Commission for "the Disappeared" and Victims of Violence) data, there are, at least, 11 local regulation which bans *Ahmadiyah* activities. Since February, 2011, after the incident in Cikeusik, Pandeglang, there are four areas that imposed official ban on *Ahmadiyah*, South Sumatera province, Pandeglang regent, Samarinda regent, and East Java province. Previously, there were some areas had had ban *Ahmadiyah* activities such as, East Lombok in 1983, Kuningan West Java (2002), Garut, West Java (2005), Cianjur, West Java (2005), and Sukabumi, West Java in 2006 (Crouch, 2009, p. 11). Many have protested to the issued of local regulation on *Ahmadiyah*, and questioned what the governor's and head of regent right to prohibit people's belief. However, the minister of internal affair, GamawanFauzi, asserted that those local regulations are in line with the constitution of the state. In

⁵⁷<http://www.vownews.com/indonesian/news/Aktivis-SKB-Picu-Kekerasan-Anti-Ahmadiyah.html>. Viewed on 30 May 2011

addition, GamawanFauzi considers those local regulations has been issued to support the Joint Ministerial Decree⁵⁸.

Furthermore, the Joint Decree also provides "fresh air" for radical Muslim groups who demand the dissolution of *Ahmadiyah*. Those groups have put strong pressure on local governments to issue a decree to ban *Ahmadiyah*. The Executive Coordinator of the Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence (Kontras), HarisAzhar, stated that the anti-Ahmadiyah protests performed by a number of religious organisations resulted in the release of local regulations on *Ahmadiyah*⁵⁹. As happened in East Java, before issuing Governor Decree no 188/94/KPT/013/2011 on *Ahmadiyah*, a number of elements belonging to the Islamic Movement for Unity (GUIB), such as the Centre for Indonesia Community Studies (CICS), GNPI (Patriot National Islamic Movement), MUI of East Java, FPI, FUI (Muslim Forum), FPIS (Islamic Youth Forum of Surabaya), Al-Ershad, LaskarArifRahmanHakiem and PPI (Indonesian Islamic Student), urged the governor to immediately issue a decree banning the *Ahmadiyah*⁶⁰.

Ahmadiyah members and their families are also severely impaired by the issuance of the Joint Ministerial Decree: they are disadvantaged socially and struggle to receive an adequate education (in comparison to the majority). The joint decree stated, they should not spread the beliefs and conduct religious activities. But this is still problematic. What about schools that are owned by the *Ahmadiyah*? Many children who do not adhere to the teachings of the *Ahmadiyah* also attend *Ahmadiyah* schools. In March 2011, two Islamic schools (Madrasah Ba'du Parakan Ummah in Salak and Madrasah Al Mahmud in Jampang Tengah) belonging to the *Ahmadiyah* Community in Sukabumi district were closed by the local government. The monitoring team members, Risbandi said, that the closing of educational institution was based on the Joint Decree of the Minister, the Governor of West Java Decree and the Regulation of Sukabumi district that prohibits all activities of *Ahmadiyah*⁶¹. The closing of these schools demonstrates that the closure of *Ahmadiyah* educational institutions is contrary to state constitution that guarantees the education for every citizen. This has also caused deep psychological impacts on

⁵⁸<http://us.nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/207156-gamawan--apa-salahnya-perda-menguatkan-skb>. Viewed on 30 May 2011

⁵⁹<http://us.nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/207130-pemerintah-dukung-perda-larangan-ahmadiyah>. Viewed on 30 May 2011

⁶⁰<http://nasional.miliah.com/read/det/ai/1234302/fpi-320-kekeraan-akibat-ulah-ahmadiyah>. Viewed on 30 May 2011

⁶¹<http://www.kbr68h.com/berita/daerah/5909-gubernur-jabar-jamin-pendidikan-anak-ahmadiyah>. Viewed on 30 May 2011

Ahmadiyah families and their children. Many *Ahmadiyah* did not dare to go to school. Likewise, they cannot perform their religious activities freely since their mosques have been closed or, in some instances, destroyed.

C. Conclusion

The tension between *Ahmadiyah* members and the majority of Muslim in Indonesia has not been resolved. This is because of the *Ahmadiyah's* teachings and beliefs, especially the doctrines of prophecy, revelation, and *jihad* that are considered as false and misleading. *Ahmadiyah* groups have always been a target of violence and their existence is currently threatened. There is no place for the *Ahmadiyah* group to live freely and practice their faith without the scrutiny from the government and other religious groups. It seems that the issuance of the Joint Decree on *Ahmadiyah* shows the inability of the government to be neutral in managing religious affairs. As such, it can be seen with the release of three ministerial decrees in 2008, and some local regulations in many provinces that narrowed the space for activities of *Ahmadiyah*. This is also because of the MUI's fatwa and the opponents groups from militant radical Islamic groups who use tactics of violence and intimidation.

Furthermore, from explanation above it can be concluded that both the MUI's fatwa and the Joint Ministerial Decree 2008 have caused the violence on *Ahmadiyah* members. However, since the issuance of the joint ministerial decree the number of acts of violations on *Ahmadiyah* mounted. In addition, recurring persecution experienced by *Ahmadiyah* followers proves that the rights of minority religious group have not yet been protected.

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